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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, several states have struggled with the consequences
of regulatory regimes they adopted in the late 1990s to restructure the
electric utility industry.' When they were implemented, the general pat-
tern of these restructuring plans included an initial rate reduction for
various customer classes, followed by a multiyear rate freeze. 2 The ex-
pected result was that during the rate freeze period, competition would
develop and power costs would decline over time, so that upon expira-
tion of the rate freeze, rates would not change, or would perhaps even
decline.3 For the most part, however, the anticipated competition did not
develop.4  Moreover, during the same period, the cost of generating
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1. Rebecca Smith, Emboldened States Take Charge of Energy Issues, WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Oct. 12, 2006, at A6. According to Smith,
State officials are asserting more control over their energy destinies ... [by] challenging
the electricity deregulation that has been fostered by the federal government in recent
years .... State officials are especially fearful of political fallout stemming from high
electricity rates and disenchantment over the unmet promises of electric-industry deregu-
lation.
Id.
2. See, for example, the restructuring statutes enacted by Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, and
Illinois as discussed in Part III of this Article.
3. Smith, supra note 1, at A6 ("Deep, liquid wholesale market--overseen by federal regula-
tors-were expected to give big suppliers good places to shop by attracting numerous power provid-
ers. Retail customers, it was thought, would buy juice from those big suppliers, bypassing their local
utilities.").
4. Id. ("Much of the current commotion is caused by the fact wholesale electricity markets
haven't developed the way people expected. . . .Instead, wholesale markets contracted after 2001
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power increased significantly, due primarily to increases in the costs of
the underlying fuel sources. When the anticipated benefits of competi-
tion failed to materialize, states considered various options for rehabili-
tating their programs. These included complete abandonment of the re-
structuring effort or mid-course corrections to the regulatory regimes,
such as extending the term of the rate freeze, or requiring rate increases
in reduced amounts to be phased in over a period of years.
These rehabilitation efforts can raise serious constitutional ques-
tions under a Takings Clause analysis under the Fifth Amendment, and
as a matter of procedural due process. This Article will review the con-
stitutional limitations that come into play when a state seeks to rehabili-
tate its failed electric utility restructuring plan. Under the Constitution,
utilities are entitled to earn a reasonable return on the assets devoted to
public service.6 A situation in which retail rates are frozen may result in
denial of a compensatory return if the electric utility is incurring higher
costs to generate or procure its power supply. This is the traditional "tak-
ings" argument based on the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, as
applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.7 Apart from this
commonly asserted argument, however, a different constitutional issue
arises in the context of proposed rate freezes. As a matter of procedural
due process, a regulated utility cannot be deprived of its opportunity to
demonstrate a need for rate relief to achieve the level of profitability that
satisfies constitutional requirements. 8  These procedural due process
rights are imperiled when, for example, a state simply extends a rate
freeze period and thereby denies the electric utility a hearing in which the
utility would have an opportunity to make its case for higher rates.
This Article will review these two separate constitutional issues, but
will focus primarily on the procedural due process implications that arise
in these restructuring controversies. Several cases have recognized and
discussed the distinctions between the common "takings" claims and the
far less common procedural due process claims that arise when a utility
and millions of consumers remained customers of their local utilities because they didn't have good
alternatives.").
5. The Maryland Public Service Commission (Maryland PSC) found, for example, that eastern
coal prices increased 69% and natural gas prices increased 200% to 300% between 1999 and 2006.
Moreover, these underlying fuel costs were shown to drive 75% to 90% of wholesale electricity
prices. Residential Electric Rate Stabilization and Market Transition Plan for the Potomac Edison
Company d/b/a Allegheny Power, Case No. 9091, Order No. 81331 (Md. PSC Mar. 30, 2007) [here-
inafter Plan].
6. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 692-93
(1923).
7. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1989).
8. Mich. Bell Tel.Co. v. Engler, No. 00-73207, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20875, at *5 (E.D.
Mich., Sept. 14, 2000).
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is denied the ability to demonstrate a need for rate relief. Part II includes
a discussion of these leading cases and their applicability to the circum-
stances when states attempt to rehabilitate electric utility restructuring
efforts. Part III continues with a review of illustrative restructuring plans
enacted in various states, and how these constitutional issues have, or
potentially will, come into play as states struggle with the results of their
restructuring regimes.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
There are two main constitutional limitations applicable to rate
regulation: (1) Taking Clause limitations; and (2) Due Process Clause
limitations. The discussion of constitutional limitations starts in Sec-
tion A with the Takings Clause claims commonly asserted by utilities in
the context of rate regulation. Takings Clause jurisprudence recognizes
that regulated utility companies must be allowed to earn a fair rate of
return on their investment. 9 If a utility regulatory commission fails to
grant rate relief in an amount adequate to provide a utility with an oppor-
tunity to earn a reasonable return, or denies recovery on a specific utility
investment, the utility may have a constitutional claim based on the Tak-
ings Clause. Where a utility is denied an opportunity to make a case
showing that rate relief is necessary (such as through extension of a rate
cap period) a Due Process Clause challenge may be available. 10 A stat-
ute on its face may violate the Due Process Clause if it does not provide
a mechanism by which the utility may seek relief from allegedly confis-
catory rates. This is in contrast to a Takings Clause claim that the rates
resulting from the implementation of the statute are confiscatory. It is a
Due Process Clause challenge that may arise in the context of states' ef-
forts to rehabilitate their failed electric utility restructuring plans. Sec-
tion B of Part II will discuss Due Process Clause jurisprudence and how
it potentially arises in the context of utility rate freeze measures.
A. The "Takings" Claim
The Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the Constitution prohibit
the government from taking private property for public use without just
9. Id. at 47-48.
10. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that
no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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compensation.1" These provisions apply to government regulation of
maximum rates, and establish a constitutionally-based floor below which
a rate ceiling must be reversed as confiscatory.1 2 In determining maxi-
mum rates, the courts initially attempted to identify the constitutional
floor by reference to an agency's determination of the regulated firm's
rate base. 13 In Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission, the Supreme Court enunciated the constitutional stan-
dard for determining the adequacy of a utility's allowed rate of return:
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a re-
turn on the value of the property which it employs for the conven-
ience of the public equal to that generally being made at the same
time and in the same general part of the country on investments in
other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding
risks and uncertainties; but it has no constitutional right to profits
such as are realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or
speculative ventures. The return should be reasonably sufficient to
assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and
should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to
maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money nec-
essary for the proper discharge of its public duties.
14
Prior to 1944, the courts engaged in a detailed review of each of the
three major components used in determining a utility's maximum rates:
(1) its rate base; (2) the allowed rate of return; and (3) operating ex-
penses.15  In 1944, in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas
11. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that
"private property" shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V, § 1.
12. Ga. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U.S. 174, 179 (1888); see also RICHARD J. PIERCE,
JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A NUTSHELL 101 (4th ed. 1999).
13. In Smyth v. Ames, for example, the Supreme Court held that rate ceilings must be based on
the "fair value" of the property devoted to public service, which was to be determined by consider-
ing the following:
[the] original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the
amount and market value of its bonds and stock, the present as compared with the origi-
nal cost of construction, the probable eaming capacity of the property under particular
rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses.
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546-47 (1898). According to Pierce & Gellhorn, "[t]he Court never
indicated which of these considerations should control where they are in conflict," but held "that
each consideration was to be given 'such weight as may be just and right in each case."' PIERCE &
GELLHORN, supra note 12, at 102 (citing McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400 (1926)).
14. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 692-93
(1923).
15. The constitutionally required rate of return identified in Bluefield is only one component in
the rate-setting process. Rates are designed to achieve a "revenue requirement," which is the amount
of dollars the utility should receive during the first year rates are to be in effect. The formula for
determining the revenue requirement (Rev. Req.) is as follows:
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Co., the Supreme Court enunciated a different approach that would not
require a detailed constitutional review of each component of the rate-
setting equation. 16 Specifically, the Court held that, in setting maximum
rates, the utility commission would not be "bound to the use of any sin-
gle formula or combination of formulae in determining rates."' 7 Rather,
it would be the "result reached[,] not the method employed" that would
be controlling.18
Hope involved the rate-setting statute under sections 4 and 5 of the
Natural Gas Act,. 19 According to Hope, "[t]he rate-making process under
the Act, i.e., the fixing of 'just and reasonable' rates, involves a balanc-
ing of the investor and the consumer interests., 20  The Court described
the investor interest as having "a legitimate concern with the financial
integrity of the company whose rates are being regulated," 2' and went on
to describe the "company or investor interest" as follows:
It is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating
expenses but also for the capital costs of the business. These in-
clude service on the debt and dividends on the stock. By that stan-
dard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with
returns on investment in other enterprises having corresponding
risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confi-
dence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its
credit and to attract capital.22
Rev. Req. = (Rate of Return times Rate Base) plus Operating Expenses
Rate of Return, or cost of capital, is composed of carrying costs on the utility's cost of
debt, cost of preferred stock (if any), and the return on equity (ROE) allowed by the
commission on common stock. Rate Base consists of the depreciated original cost of the
various assets the utility uses in order to provide utility service such as, in the case of an
electric utility, its generating plants, poles and wires, and buildings. Operating Expenses
are the normal operating costs incurred by the utility in providing utility service, such as
salaries, fuel costs, rent, and taxes.
C. PHILLIPS JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 157 (1984).
16. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
17. Id. at 602.
18. Id.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 717c-d (2005). Section 4(a) of the Natural Gas Act provides that "all rates and
charges made, demanded, or received by any natural-gas company for or in connection with the
transportation or sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission ... shall be just
and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is declared to be unlaw-
ful." 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a).
20. Hope, 320 U.S. at 603 (emphasis in original).
21. Id.
22. Id. (internal citation omitted); see also PHILLIPS JR., supra note 15.
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The three tests established by the Court in Bluefield and Hope are
commonly referred to as: (1) the comparable earnings test; (2) the finan-
cial integrity test; and (3) the attraction of capital test.23  According to
Bluefield, rates that fail to meet these standards "are unjust, unreasonable
and confiscatory, and their enforcement deprives the public utility com-
pany of its property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.,
24
The "just and reasonable" standard in utility ratemaking statutes is a
term of art, and typically requires a balancing between the interests of the
owners of the utility (i.e., the utility investors) and the utility's custom-
ers. 25 This balancing recognizes that while utility customers should pay
rates that are reasonable, the rates must be sufficient to produce a profit
level that enables the utility to maintain its financial integrity and attract
capital.26 In turn, these standards require that the interests of utility
shareholders be balanced with the interests of utility customers.2 7  In
achieving this balance, there is a constitutional minimum, established in
Bluefield and reaffirmed by Hope, which must be satisfied.28
Thus, any balancing of investor and consumer interests can take
place only within the parameters, or zone, of reasonableness, bordered by
the two illegal extremes: illegal confiscatory rates at the lower end, and
illegal exploitative rates at the upper end.29 As stated by Judge Bazelon
in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker,
there are limits inherent in the statutory mandate that rates be "rea-
sonable, just and non-discriminatory." Among those limits are the
23. Walter Pond, The Law Governing the Fixing of Public Utility Rates: A Response to Recent
Judicial and Academic Misconceptions, 41 ADMIN L. REV. 1, 9 (1989); see also Raymond F. Gor-
man, Martin F. Grace & Gautam Vora, Public Utility Underwriting Costs and Regulatory Climate:
An Examination ofPUC and SEC Multiple Jurisdictions, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 17, 30-31 (1993).
24. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 690
(1923).
25. Hope, 320 U.S. at 603.
26. Bluefield, 262 U.S. at 692-93.
27. See Patrick J. McCormick & Sean B. Cunningham, The Requirements of the "Just and
Reasonable" Standard: Legal Bases for Reform of Electric Transmission Rates, 21 ENERGY L. J.
389, 398-99 (2000). The traditional starting point in interpreting the term "just and reasonable" has
been an analysis of the Takings Clause implications under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution. That article discusses the ratemaking standard under Section 205 of the Federal
Power Act, which requires "all rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility
for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission" to be "just and reasonable." 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2005).
28. The boundaries of discretion have been described by Judge Robert Bork as follows: "In
reviewing a rate order courts must determine whether or not the end results of that order constitutes a
reasonable balancing . . . of the investor interest in maintaining financial integrity and access to
capital markets and consumer interest in being charged non-exploitative rates." Jersey Cent. Power
& Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 810 F.2d 1168, 1177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also
Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 234 F.3d 36,42 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
29. Pond, supra note 23, at 30.
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minimal requirements for protection of investors outlined in the
Hope case. And from the earliest cases, the end of public utility
regulation has been recognized to be protection of consumers from
exorbitant rates. Thus, there is a zone of reasonableness within
which rates may properly fall. It is bounded at one end by the in-
vestor interest against confiscation and at the other by the consumer
interest against exorbitant rates.
30
The most recent U.S. Supreme Court case that illustrates Takings
Clause jurisprudence in a utilities context is Duquesne v. Barasch.3' In
Duquesne, the utility challenged a Pennsylvania statute that prohibited
including expenditures connected with nuclear power plants that were
planned, but never built, in the utility's rate base. Notwithstanding the
statute, the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission (PUC) issued an
order that would have allowed Duquesne to collect approximately $35
million in rates over ten years as an operating expense to recover a por-
tion of its expenditures on the abandoned plants. In response, Pennsyl-
vania's Consumer Advocate appealed the PUC's decision in the Penn-
sylvania courts. In affirming the state supreme court's decision, the ap-
peals court ruled that a state scheme of regulation does not "take" a util-
ity's property within the meaning of the Takings Clause simply because
it disallows recovery of capital investments that are not "used and use-
ful" in service to the public.32
In its Takings Clause analysis, the Duquesne court cited the guiding
principle that "the Constitution protects utilities from being limited to a
charge for their property serving the public that is so 'unjust' as to be
confiscatory., 33 Where the rate set by a state in its ratemaking process
does not provide sufficient compensation, "the State has taken the use of
utility property without paying just compensation, and so violated the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 34 At the same time, however, the
Duquesne court acknowledged that a number of constitutionally
30. Wash. Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952
(1951).
31. 399 U.S. 299 (1989).
32. Id. at 300.
33. Id. at 307 (citing FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 391-92 (1974) ("All that is protected,
in a constitutional sense, is that the rates fixed by the Commission be higher than a confiscatory
leve."); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942) ("By long standing usage in the
field of rate regulation, the 'lowest reasonable rate' is one which is not confiscatory in the constitu-
tional sense."); Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 (1896)
(A rate is too low if it is "so unjust as to destroy the value of [the] property for all the purposes for
which it was acquired," and in so doing "practically deprive[s] the owner of property with out due
process of law.").
34. Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 308.
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acceptable methods of fixing utility rates could be used. The court reit-
erated the analysis of Hope, and stated that many of the subsidiary as-
pects of ratemaking do not have "a constitutional dimension, despite the
fact that they might affect property rights to some degree. '' 35 Duquesne
affirmed the teachings of Hope, stating that "it is not the theory, but the
impact of the rate order which counts. 36  At the same time, Duquesne
acknowledged that this "end results" approach used in Hope preserves a
utility's ability to raise constitutional takings claims:
This language, of course, does not dispense with all of the constitu-
tional difficulties when a utility raises a claim that the rate which it
is permitted to charge is so low as to be confiscatory: whether a par-
ticular rate is "unjust" or "unreasonable" will depend to some extent
on what is a fair rate of return given the risks under a particular rate
setting system, and on the amount of capital upon which the inves-
tors are entitled to earn that return. At the margins, these questions
have constitutional overtones.
37
With respect to the "fair rate of return" to which utility investors are
entitled in setting "just and reasonable" rates, Duquesne referred to the
comparable earnings standard enunciated under Bluefield. This test
states that the "return to the equity owner should be commensurate with
returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. 38
Even though the actions of the Pennsylvania PUC did not result in a con-
stitutionally impermissible rate, the Duquesne decision clarified and con-
firmed the ability of a utility to assert Takings Clause claims. Specifi-
cally, "[t]he Constitution protects the utility from the net effect of the
rate order on its property. 39
The difficulty with Takings Clause claims, however, is that the con-
stitutional requirement that a business be permitted a return sufficient to
maintain its financial integrity "does not necessarily require any particu-
lar level of profit above what is adequate to attract and retain invested
capital., 40 As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Permian Basin Area
35. Id. at 310.
36. Id. "If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unreasonable, judicial inquiry
... is at an end. The fact that the method employed to reach that result may contain infirmities is not
then important." Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
37. Duquesne Light, 488 U.S. at 310.
38. Id. at 314 (citing Bluefield Water Works & Improvement. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262
U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923) ("A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return
... equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country
on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncer-
tainties.")).
39. Id.
40. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. New Jersey, 590 A.2d 191, 199 (N.J. 1991).
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Rate Cases, "regulation may, consistently with the Constitution, limit
stringently the return recovered on the investment, for investors' interests
provide only one of the variables in the constitutional calculus of reason-
ableness.",4' As noted above, Hope requires that consideration of the in-
vestors' interests must be counterbalanced by consideration of the con-
42sumers' interests. In taking account of the consumers' interests and
balancing them against investors' interests, regulators have considerable
discretion in determining a fair rate of return when determining "just and
reasonable" rates under the rate setting statutes.43 Thus, while claims
under the Takings Clause provide a legitimate basis for regulated utilities
to seek relief from adverse impacts of state restructuring schemes, the
likelihood of success of judicial challenges under Takings Clause claims
is not great.
B. The Right to Procedural Due Process
Several leading cases recognize and discuss the difference between
the commonly asserted takings argument and a different constitutional
issue-procedural due process-that may arise when limitations such as
rate freezes are imposed to interfere with the regulated entity's ability to
seek rate relief. These procedural due process rights have been recog-
nized for decades in the case of rent control regimes. More recently,
these issues have risen in the context of limitations proposed by states on
the ability of insurance carriers to increase rates for insurance coverage.
The most recent application concern the proposed imposition of rate
freezes on regulated utilities.
Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley44 is a 1976 decision from the Califor-
nia Supreme Court which illustrates the procedural due process require-
ments of a rent control program. In Birkenfeld, a charter amendment
adopted by the initiative process required the City of Berkeley to impose
residential rent controls. The amendment required a blanket rollback of
all controlled rents, and severely limited the city's ability to make any
adjustments in maximum rents, except under a unit-by-unit procedure
that "would be incapable of effecting necessary adjustments throughout
the city within any reasonable period of time.' 45 After citing Hope for
the proposition that "whether a regulation of prices is reasonable or
41. In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769 (1968) (citing Covington & Lex-
ington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 (1896)).
42. Hope, 320 U.S. at 603.
43. See PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 12, at 134-44.
44. 550 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1976).
45. Id. at 1007.
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confiscatory depends ultimately on the result reached," the California
Supreme Court found that a regulation "may be invalid on its face when
its terms will not permit those who administer it to avoid confiscatory
results. 46 The court invalidated the amendment as "constitutionally de-
ficient" because it "withholds powers by which the rent control board
could adjust maximum rents without unreasonable delays and instead
requires the [Rent Control] Board to follow an adjustment procedure
which would make such delays inevitable. 47
In a subsequent decision involving a rent control regime, in Fisher
v. City of Berkeley48 the California Supreme Court again distinguished
between the constitutional "fair return" requirements of Hope and the
constitutional requirements associated with the procedures whereby land-
lords could be assured of the opportunity to earn that fair return. In
Fisher, the court acknowledged a "veritable smorgasbord" of administra-
tive standards by which to determine rent ceilings. 49 The court observed
that under the standards of Hope, no particular method or formula is re-
quired; rather, selection of an administrative standard to fix rents "is a
task for local governments ... and not the courts.' 50
At issue in Fisher was whether the due process obstacles would
prevent the Rent Control Board from avoiding confiscatory results.51 In
this regard, the court observed that the rent control ordinance "may not
indefinitely freeze the dollar amount of [a landlord's] profits without
eventually causing confiscatory results."52 Because the court found that
the ordinance was drawn in a sufficiently broad manner, confiscatory
results could be avoided, and the ordinance survived a challenge to its
facial validity.
53
The California Supreme Court applied the constitutional due proc-
ess principles of Birkenfeld several years later when determining the va-
lidity of a statewide initiative concerning auto insurance rates. At issue
46. Id. at 1027.
47. Id. at 1030 (citing Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591 (1926)) ("Property may be
as effectively taken by long continued and unreasonable delay in putting an end to confiscatory rates
as by express affirmance of them .... ); see also Apartment Ass'n of Greater Los Angeles v. Santa
Monica Rent Control Bd., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228, 232 (1994) ("Rent control regulations can have a
confiscatory effect if no rent adjustment mechanism is provided, and a regulation may be invalid on
its face when its terms will not permit those who administer it to avoid confiscatory results in its
application to the complaining parties.").
48. 693 P.2d 261 (Cal. 1984).
49. Id. at 290.
50. Id. at 291.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 292 (emphasis in original).
53. Id. at 293. In particular, the court noted that nothing in the ordinance precludes the Board
from adjusting the percentage rate of return on investment in order to increase a landlord's amount
of profits. Id.
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in Calfarm Insurance Co. v. Deukmejian54 was Proposition 103, passed
by the California voters in November 1988, which immediately reduced
insurance rates by twenty percent, and placed strict limitations on the
ability of the Insurance Commission to allow rate increases during the
following year."5 The insurance companies argued that the initiative's
rate regulation provisions violated the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
and California Constitutions because, among other reasons, adequate
procedures were not provided to ensure prompt rate relief.56 Citing its
previous decisions in Birkenfeld and Fisher, the court stated that it would
"focus less on the rate specified in the statute than on the ability of the
seller to obtain relief if that rate proves confiscatory. 57
The court recognized that "virtually any law which sets prices may
prove confiscatory in practice," and thus the role of the courts is to "care-
fully scrutinize[] such provisions to ensure that the sellers will have an
adequate remedy for relief from confiscatory rates.' '58 In this regard,
Proposition 103 allowed rates and premiums to be increased during the
initial one-year period following enactment, only if the Insurance Com-
mission could find that "an insurer is substantially threatened with insol-
vency. '59 The court found that while "insolvency" has "various mean-
ings," none of these meanings would allow it to construe this standard
"to conform to the constitutional standard of a fair and reasonable re-
turn.160 The effect of the provision was to "bar safely solvent insurers
from obtaining rate relief from 'inadequate' rates until Novem-
ber 1989,,,61 which "preclude[d] adjustments necessary to achieve the
constitutional standard of fair and reasonable rates., 62 The section of the
initiative containing the "substantial insolvency" provision was therefore
found to be invalid under the due process clauses of the state and federal
constitutions.63
Following California's lead in enactment of Proposition 103, the
Nevada Legislature adopted Chapter 784 in June 1989. This legislation
mandated an immediate rollback of motor vehicle liability insurance
54. 771 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989).
55. Id. at 1250 (citing CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01(b)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1252.
58. Id. at 1253.
59. Id. (citing CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01(b)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1254.
62. Id. at 1255.
63. Id. at 1256. The court was able to sever the insolvency provisions from the remainder of
Proposition 103 and refused to find the provision for a rollback and reduction of at least twenty
percent to violate of the due process rights of insurers. Id. at 1257-59.
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rates to the levels that were in effect on July 1, 1988. This would mean a
rate reduction of at least fifteen percent, and a rate freeze for a one-year
period from October 1, 1989, until October 1, 1990.64 Similar to Cali-
fornia Proposition 103, relief from the rate freeze was available only if
the Insurance Commission could find that an insurer was "substantially
threatened with insolvency" after considering the profitability of all lines
of insurance transacted by the insurer within Nevada.65 The insurers
brought suit in federal court, alleging that Chapter 784 violated due proc-
ess requirements because it prohibited rate relief to avoid confiscatory
results. In Guaranty National Insurance Co. v. Gates,66 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed with the insurers, finding that Chapter 784 was
unconstitutional because it failed to provide "any mechanism to guaran-
tee a constitutionally required fair and reasonable return. 67 In so doing,
the Ninth Circuit cited extensively from the procedural due process
analysis in Calfarm.68
Within the next year, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered a
constitutional challenge to the Fair Automobile Insurance Reform Act of
1990,69 which was enacted in order to reduce insurance costs for most
New Jersey drivers. 70  Prior to the Reform Act, New Jersey had adopted
a system that allocated high-risk drivers to insurance carriers and that
provided such drivers with coverage at rates equivalent to those charged
in the "voluntary" market. 71 The pool to which these high-risk drivers
were assigned ultimately accumulated a deficit of over $3.3 billion by the
64. Guaranty Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508, 509 (9th Cir. 1990).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 512. With respect to the constitutional requirement of a "fair and reasonable return,"
Othe Ninth Circuit stated that "[tihe concept of a 'fair and reasonable' return as a constitutional stan-
dard for regulated industries is derived from early Supreme Court cases discussing the Natural Gas
Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 717," which cites the "just and reasonable" rate standard discussed in Fed-
eral Power Comm 'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 581-82 (1942). Id at 513.
68. Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co., 916 F.2d at 513-15. Unlike the action of the California Supreme
Court with respect to Proposition 103, however, the Ninth Circuit was unable to sever the insolvency
provisions from the remainder of Chapter 784 as there was no constitutionally permissible standard
to take its place. Id. at 514. The Nevada Insurance Code defined rates to be "inadequate if they are
clearly insufficient, together with the income from investments attributable to them, to sustain pro-
jected losses and expenses in the class of business of which they apply." Id. at 515 (citing NEV.
REV. STAT. § 686B.050(3)). Given that this definition guarantees only that an insurer will "break
even" and "does not guarantee the constitutionally required 'fair and reasonable return"' required by
Hope, "inadequate" is defined "in a constitutionally unacceptable fashion" and the Ninth Circuit was
unable to sever the insolvency provision from Chapter 784 and uphold the rest of the measure as the
California Supreme Court did in Calfarm. Id.
69. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:30A-1-20 (2007).
70. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. State, 590 A.2d 191, 196 (N.J. 1991).
71. Id. at 195.
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time the Reform Act was adopted.72 One of the objectives of the Reform
Act was to pay off this accumulated debt by imposing on insurers a sur-
charge for "insolvency assessments" and a special surtax for a three-year
period.73 The insurers challenged the constitutionality of the Reform Act
in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. New Jersey because
other provisions of the Reform Act prohibited insurers from passing
these new assessments through to policyholders. 74 The insurers claimed
that under the Reform Act, the Commissioner of Insurance was pre-
cluded from granting any rate relief to counteract the substantial loss of
net income resulting from the new assessments and surtaxes. The insur-
ers argued that this would force them to operate at a loss and deprive
them of a constitutionally adequate rate of return.75
The New Jersey Supreme Court, after distinguishing between sub-
stantive due process claims and takings claims, characterized the essence
of the insurers' claim as a confiscatory taking: the substantial additional
costs of the new assessments and surtaxes would "necessarily restrict
carriers to a negative, or a break-even, or only a minimally positive re-
turn. ' 76 The court agreed with the insurers that the Reform Act abso-
lutely prohibited a pass-through of surtaxes and assessments in the form
of direct premium increases or direct rate relief.77 Another section of the
Reform Act, however, emphasized that insurers were "entitled to earn an
adequate rate of return." 78 According to the court, enactment of this sec-
tion "demonstrate[d] the Legislature's awareness and accommodation of
the constitutional requirements that insurers must receive a fair rate of
return., 79 Based on this provision, the Department of Insurance issued
new regulations that established a special, separate rate-increase filing
procedure for any insurer claiming that the effect of the surtaxes and as-
sessments, in its particular case, was to preclude a constitutionally ade-
quate rate of return.80 The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the
Reform Act was not facially unconstitutional as a confiscatory taking
because the economic effect of the surtaxes and assessments could be
72. Id. at 196.
73. Id. at 197.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 201.
77. Id. at 206.
78. Id. at 202 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:33B-2(g) (2007)).
79. Id. at 204.
80. Id. at 204.
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considered in addressing an insurer's claim that it was being deprived of
a constitutionally adequate rate of return.81
In 2000, the courts addressed the issue of a proposed rate freeze in
the context of ratemaking for utility companies. The Michigan State
Legislature enacted the Michigan Telecommunications Act of 2000
(MTA), 2 which included a provision, Section 701, that froze regulated
telephone rates at their May 1, 2000 level until December 31, 2003, ex-
cept for services deemed competitive by the Michigan Public Service
Commission. 83  Two telephone companies, Ameritech Michigan and
Verizon North, challenged the constitutionality of the MTA. These com-
panies claimed that the MTA was "facially unconstitutional" under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it did not
provide a mechanism through which telephone service providers may
ensure that they receive a just and reasonable rate of return on their in-
vestment. 84 In bringing their action, plaintiffs emphasized two decisions:
Calfarm and Guaranty National.
85
In evaluating the attack on the MTA, the U.S. District Court distin-
guished between claims under the Takings Clause versus those under the
Due Process Clause. The court analyzed Duquesne and Hope and con-
cluded that "Takings Clause jurisprudence ... may require that regulated
utility companies be allowed to earn a fair rate of return on their invest-
ment., 86 Citing Duquesne, the court stated that the "guiding principle"
under the Takings Clause "has been that the Constitution protects utilities
from being limited to a charge for their property serving the public which
is so unjust as to be confiscatory. 87 The court went on to observe that
neither Duquesne nor Hope "dealt with a facial due process challenge" of
the kind presented by the telephone companies in this case. The court
stated the issue as follows:
[T]he Takings Clause challenge would be an 'as applied' challenge
to the result of the statute-i.e., that the rates resulting from the im-
plementation of the statute are confiscatory. That is different from
the argument the Court encounters today-namely that the statute
on its face violates the Due Process Clause because it provides no
81. Id. at 205-06.
82. Michigan Telecommunications Act, H.B. No. 5721, 90th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (2000)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of MICH. COMP. LAWS § 484).
83. Id. Section 710 applied to telephone rates for service providers with more than 250,000
subscribers.
84. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Engler, No. 00-73207, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20876 at *4-5
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 14, 2000).
85. Id. at *43-48.
86. Id. at *48 (emphasis in original).
87. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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mechanism by which the Plaintiffs may seek relief from any alleg-
edly confiscatory rates.
88
The court found the Calfarm and Guaranty National cases "con-
vincing" and held that "the Due Process Clause requires that a state have
a mechanism available by which regulated utilities may request relief
from allegedly confiscatory rates." 89 Given that the three-year rate freeze
of Section 701 precluded the operation of such a mechanism "for an un-
reasonable amount of time," the court found that "serious questions as to
the constitutionality" of the rate freeze had been raised and granted an
injunction against enforcement of that section of the MTA.90
This decision was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.91
Citing Calfarm, National Guaranty, and State Farm, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that "the Due Process Clause requires a mechanism through
which a regulated utility may challenge the imposition of rates which
may be confiscatory. 92  The court determined that MTA section 701
"does not include any provisions which adequately safeguard against
imposition of confiscatory rates," and therefore concluded that the plain-
tiffs demonstrated a substantial likelihood of showing the provision to be
unconstitutional.93 Accordingly, the preliminary injunction against en-
forcing the provision granted by the District Court was upheld.94
Within three years, this Due Process Clause analysis was applied in
the context of a rate freeze imposed on an electric utility. In Mononga-
hela Power Co. v. Schriber,95 an electric utility challenged a provision of
the Ohio Restructuring Act that imposed a rate freeze on rates charged to
industrial and large commercial customers. The Ohio Restructuring Act,
passed by the legislature in June 1999, required electric utilities in Ohio
to implement a transition plan that would give customers the right to pur-
chase electricity from competing retail suppliers.96  During a "market
development period" through December 31, 2005, the rates chargeable to
retail customers were frozen at pre-Restructuring Act levels. 97 The Pub-
lic Utility Commission of Ohio was authorized to provide for an earlier
termination of the rate freeze period upon a showing that effective
88. Id. (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at *51.
90. Id.
91. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Engler, 257 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2001).
92. Id. at 593.
93. Id. at 594-96.
94. Id. at 600.
95. Monongahela Power Co. v. Schriber, 322 F. Supp. 2d 902 (S.D. Ohio 2004).
96. Id. at 907 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.31 (2007)).
97. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.40(B)(2)(2007)).
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competition existed in the utility's service territory or if twenty percent
of the utility's load had switched suppliers.98
During the intervening period in which Monongahela's transition
plan was in effect, the electric utility experienced increases in the cost of
the wholesale power supply purchased to serve its industrial and large
commercial customers. Monongahela alleged that it was obligated to
purchase power at a market price in excess of the rates it was permitted
to charge under the rate freeze. It further claimed that if the rate freeze
remained in effect through December 31, 2005, it would lose between
$27 million and $35 million over a two-year period.99 Monongahela
contended that the rate freeze provisions of the Ohio Restructuring Act
constituted a facial violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, citing the Michigan Bell decision from the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals.100
The court found the Due Process claim in Michigan Bell to be "in-
distinguishable in all material respects" from the claims of Mononga-
hela. 101 According to the court, "(t]he particular provisions of the Ohio
Restructuring Act that freeze rates and do not provide a mechanism for
[Monongahela Power] to challenge its current rates as confiscatory...
are unconstitutional."' 1 2 Because the Act "contains no procedural device
which would permit the [Public Utility Commission of Ohio] to deter-
mine whether the rates imposed under the Restructuring Act are confis-
catory," these provisions violate the Due Process Clause.
C. Implications with Respect to the States'Restructuring Experience
The availability of a Due Process Clause challenge under certain
circumstances provides a much stronger basis for electric utilities to pro-
tect their financial interests in the face of state efforts to rehabilitate their
restructuring regimes. If the proposed "fix" involves the imposition of a
rate freeze or the extension of a previously agreed-upon rate freeze, the
utility may not be limited to the daunting challenge of mounting a Tak-
ings Clause claim. A Takings Clause challenge, by its very nature, is an
"as applied" challenge to the result of the statute and would require:
(1) an evidentiary demonstration regarding the financial results produced
by the statute; (2) competing expert testimony offered by the utility and
its opponents about the "fair" rate of return necessary for the utility to
attract and retain capital; and (3) overcoming the considerable deference
98. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.40(B) (2)(a-b)(2007)).
99. Id. at 911.
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that would be accorded regulators both in making findings about the fi-
nancial results produced and the required return necessary to be "fair."
Under a Due Process Clause challenge, on the other hand, the util-
ity would have the far easier path as identified in Michigan Bell; "namely
that the statute on its face violates the Due Process Clause because it
provides no mechanism by which the [utility] may seek relief from any
allegedly confiscatory rates."'' 0 3 The utility would be relieved of the bur-
den associated with the Takings Clause challenge; instead, the argument
would be that the absence of any mechanism removes the ability of the
utility to present the evidence necessary to support a Takings Clause
claim. As discussed below, the availability of the Due Process Clause
challenge proved to be valuable to electric utilities in protecting their
financial interests during the controversies associated with state efforts to
rehabilitate restructuring regimes. As these controversies continue to
play out in other states, this Due Process Clause remedy will likely re-
ceive increasing attention.
III. THE STATES' RESTRUCTURING EXPERIENCE
This Part will examine the experience of four states in resolving the
controversies that arose in connection with their efforts to restructure the
electric utility industry. The underlying circumstances in each state were
similar. Each involved restructuring regimes which included multi-year
"market transition periods" during which electric rates were frozen or
capped, followed by the specter of huge rate increases for residential cus-
tomers upon the expiration of the rate caps and the transition to "market-
based" prices. The manner in which the controversies were resolved
were somewhat different in each state, although a common theme
seemed to be a "brinksmanship" approach that ultimately led to a negoti-
ated solution involving all the stakeholders to the process. Each involved
proposals with respect to modification of rate freeze periods and pro-
vided the utilities with opportunities to assert Due Process Clause claims
rather than the more common-and more challenging-Takings Clause
claims.
The survey begins with Maryland, which involved a high-stakes po-
litical drama that included passage of emergency legislation that would
have removed the members of the Maryland Public Service Commission
(Maryland PSC). The events were triggered by the prospect of a massive
72 percent increase in the residential rates of Maryland's largest electric
103. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Engler, No. 00-73207, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20876 at *40
(E.D. Mich. 2000) (emphasis added).
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utility and ended with a legislatively enacted rate phase-in plan. The
possibility of simply extending the duration of the rate caps and trigger-
ing a Due Process Clause challenge was rejected in favor of phasing in
the required rate increases over a period of years.
The experience in Delaware was much less political, although the
rate increases resulting from its "transition" to market rates were nearly
as large (59 percent). Delaware also responded by allowing the rate caps
to expire, but instead it spread the required rate increase over a longer
period through a legislatively enacted rate plan.
In the case of Virginia, its rate caps were not due to expire until
2011; mindful of the experience of its neighboring states of Maryland
and Delaware, Virginia anticipated the controversy and avoided it by
accelerating the termination of the caps by two years, and implemented a
hybrid approach to regulation under which Virginia's utilities would be
regulated.
Illinois provides the best illustration of "brinksmanship" and the
utilities' ability to assert a Due Process Clause challenge in response to a
proposed extension of rate caps. In response to enactment of legislation
extending rate caps for an additional three years, Illinois utilities faced
downgrades in their credit ratings and claimed the possibility of bank-
ruptcy. A global settlement was ultimately reached under which Illinois
utilities collectively provided $1 billion dollars of rate relief to customers
to assist in paying the higher rates that had taken effect in the "transition"
to market rates.
In addition to the examples of these first four states, other states are
in the early stages of addressing imminent controversies. In Ohio, for
example, the state's rate caps are scheduled to expire on December 31,
2008; this event is expected to result in similarly large rate increases. As
in the case of the controversy in Illinois, one of the options being dis-
cussed is a possible extension of the existing rate caps beyond 2008.
This would likely trigger the financial community reaction-and poten-
tial Due Process Clause challenge-that occurred in Illinois.
A. Maryland
On April 8, 1999, Maryland Governor Parris Glendening signed
into law the Electric Customer Choice and Competition Act (Maryland
Restructuring Act).1°4 This act established the legal framework for the
restructuring and revised regulation of the electric industry in
104. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. §§ 7-501 to -509 (2007).
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Maryland. 0 5 The Maryland PSC cited several objectives in support of
moving to a competitive electric market. These objectives included:
(1) putting downward pressure on costs and thereby "providing custom-
ers with the lowest possible electricity prices"; (2) allowing customers
the opportunity to select their electricity supplier; (3) providing "incen-
tives for the creation and development of innovative products and ser-
vices"; (4) ensuring reliability by creating a competitive market structure
to provide power plant developers with the necessary incentives to build
additional generation; and (5) attracting new business development, re-
taining existing businesses, and enhancing overall economic growth in
Maryland.
0 6
The Maryland Restructuring Act was typical of the restructuring
regimes enacted by several states. It achieved a partial restructuring of
the supply of electricity, but it did not restructure the transmission and
distribution of electricity in the state.'0 7 The electric public service com-
panies became "wires" companies and provided the essential transmis-
sion and distribution line "links" between customers while the entities
provided the electric supply service.10 8 The Maryland Restructuring Act
retained the authorized service territories of Maryland's electric utilities,
and, within those territories, Maryland's electric utility companies con-
tinued to provide regulated transmission and distribution services.0 9 The
Maryland PSC continued to regulate the price, terms, and conditions of
the delivery of electricity within Maryland. 10 With respect to the supply
of electricity to be delivered to customers, the Maryland Restructuring
Act granted customers the ability to choose their electric supplier."' The
Maryland PSC was empowered to review applications from competing
electricity suppliers and to authorize qualified suppliers to operate in
105. Status Report by the Public Service Commission of Maryland on Electricity Procurement
in Maryland, at 1 (Md. PSC Feb. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Status Report], available at
http://www.psc.state.md.us/psc/Reports/ElecRestrucWhitePaper2005.pdf.
106. Ten-Year Plan (2006-2015) of Electric Companies in Maryland, at 3 (Md. PSC Dec.
2006), available at http://www.psc.state.md.us/psc/Reports/2006- I OYrPlan.pdf.
107. Status Report, supra note 105, at 1-2.
108. Report to the Governor and Maryland General Assembly on the Status of Electric Re-
structuring and the Structure, Procurement, and Terms of Standard Offer Service, at 2 (Md. PSC
Dec. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Report], available at
http://www.psc.state.md.us/psc/Reports/ReportonStatusofElectricRestructuring 010 22007.pdf.
109. Status Report, supra note 105, at 2.
110. Id.
I ll. Id. at 1; see also MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. §§ 7-504, 7-510 (2007).
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Maryland.'1 12 Maryland's investor-owned utilities were also authorized to
sell or transfer their generation assets to others.13
Under the Maryland Restructuring Act, full retail competition was
to begin on July 1, 2002.114 The Maryland PSC accelerated restructuring
implementation through settlements with all four of the state's investor-
owned utilities and its two major cooperatives. 1 5 Customers of Mary-
land's investor-owned utilities had the ability to choose their electric
supplier as of July 1, 2000, while customers of Maryland's two largest
electric cooperatives (Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative and
Choptank Electric Cooperative) received this right in 2001.116 Municipal
utilities and two small co-ops were excluded from a choice mandate.
117
The Maryland Restructuring Act mandated residential rate cuts
ranging from 3 percent to 7.5 percent with rate caps for four years. 1 8
Baltimore Gas & Electric (BGE) reduced electric rates for its residential
customers by 6.5 percent in July 2000, and agreed to freeze these rates
until June 30, 2006.119 BGE also agreed to a rate freeze for its large
commercial and industrial customers through June 30, 2002, and for its
remaining commercial and industrial customers until June 30, 2004.
Delmarva Power & Light d/b/a Connectiv Power Delivery (Connectiv)
reduced electric rates for its residential customers by 7.5 percent in
July 2000; it also agreed to freeze rates for all customers through
June 30, 2004.120 Potomac Electric Power Company (PEPCO) reduced
112. Status Report, supra note 105, at 2. ("As of December 31, 2004, the Maryland PSC had
issued 32 electric supplier licenses and 18 electric broker licenses. The Electric Choice Act required
potential suppliers to prove their financial qualifications before receiving a license from the Mary-
land PSC.").
113. Id. at 1.
114. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-510(a)(1)(iv)(2007). The Maryland Restruc-
turing Act required the Maryland PSC to designate a supplier in each electric utility's service terri-
tory to offer a default electric supply service referred to as standard offer service (Standard Offer).
Id. § 7-510(c). This service is a generation supply service available to customers who do not choose
a competitive electric supplier, or customers who choose a competitive electric supplier and thereaf-
ter elect to return to Standard Offer service. Id. § 7-510(c)(2)(iv)-(v). The Maryland PSC desig-
nated each investor-owned utility as the Standard Offer service provider within its own service terri-
tory until July 1, 2003. Id. § 7-510(c)(3)(i). The Maryland PSC extended this Standard Offer ser-
vice obligation for all the investor-owned utilities and the two major electric cooperatives. Id.
§ 7-51 0(c)(3)(ii).
115. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: The Administration for Children and
Families, National Energy Affordability and Accessibility Project, Maryland,
http://neaap.ncat.org/restructuring/md-re.htm [hereinafter Project] (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).
116. Status Report, supra note 105, at 1.
117. Project, supra note 115.
118. Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-505(d)(1), (d)(4)(i).
119. John Kwoka, Restructuring the U.S. Electric Power Sector: A Review of Recent
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electric rates for its residential customers by 7.0 percent, and reduced
electric rates for its non-residential customers by 4.0 percent in
July 2000. PEPCO also agreed to freeze rates for all customers through
June 30, 2004.121 Potomac Edison Company dlb/a Allegheny Power (Al-
legheny) reduced electric rates for its residential customers in July 2000,
and agreed to freeze these rates through December 31, 2008.122 Alle-
gheny's commercial and industrial customers received a rate freeze
through December 31, 2004.123
The Maryland Restructuring Act also gave direction to the Mary-
land PSC with respect to the procurement of electric supplies to satisfy
the Standard Offer service obligations. That procurement was to be done
competitively and at a market price that permitted the recovery of verifi-
able and prudently incurred costs to obtain or produce the electricity, as
well as a reasonable return. 124 Under the Restructuring Act, the Mary-
land PSC was to oversee a competitive procurement to determine the
market price of electricity. The PSC established a competitive bidding
process in Case No. 8908.125 The length of each procurement contract
depended on the restructuring schedule for each utility and varied be-
tween one, two, and three years. 126 In order to minimize the chance of
temporary price spikes due to weather abnormalities, for example, the
procurement process established in Case No. 8908 also separated the
bidding over a three to four month period that stretched from December
of a given year into March of the following year.
127
Procurements for Standard Offer service were relatively uneventful
during the 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 bid periods, although prices
trended steadily upward. 128 In the case of Connectiv, for example, its
average bill for small commercial customers decreased by 5 percent upon
expiration of the rate freeze in July 2004, while residential customers
121. Id.
122. Status Report, supra note 105, at 4.
123. Id. The customers of Maryland's two large electric cooperatives received rate benefits as
well: Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative (SMECO) on January 1, 2001 and Choptank Electric
Cooperative (Choptank) on July 1, 2001. SMECO's customers received a rate reduction of ap-
proximately six percent and a rate freeze through December 31, 2004. While Choptank did not
reduce its rates, it agreed to freeze its retail prices at the existing rate level through June 30, 2005.
Id. at 2, 4.
124. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § § 7-510(c)(3)(ii)(2), 7-510(c)(4) (2007).
125. Report, supra note 108, at 3 (citing In re Commission's Inquiry into the Competitive Se-
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experienced an increase of 12 percent. 129 In 2005, the total annual bill
for Connectiv customers increased by an average of 5.8 percent.
130
BGE's small commercial and industrial customers experienced an in-
crease of 17 percent upon expiration of the rate freeze in July 2004.131
PEPCO's residential and small commercial customers experienced in-
creases of 16 percent upon expiration of the rate freeze in July 2004, and
the average annual bill went up another 4.6 percent in 2005.32
Beginning in the summer of 2005, however, wholesale electric
prices in the mid-Atlantic region increased significantly due to increased
demand, "coupled with constraints in transmission infrastructure limiting
the availability of lower cost generation available to serve that de-
mand., 133 As utilities procured energy in late 2005 and early 2006 for
delivery in the summer of 2006, prevailing wholesale electricity prices in
the market were significantly higher than in previous years. 134 Accord-
ing to a Maryland PSC report for 2006, bids and prices for standard offer
type services in Maryland, the District of Columbia, Delaware, New Jer-
sey, and Pennsylvania all reflected similar price levels due to the increase
in natural gas prices and transmission congestion. 135 In addition, compe-
tition did not develop as expected. 136 As a result, electric supply price
increases that occurred from the competitive 2005-2006 procurements
produced typical customer bill impacts of a 35 percent to 72 percent in-
crease in annual bills. 137 In BGE's case, this was the first procurement
following expiration of the price caps: 100 percent of its standard offer
service load was procured. This resulted in a 72 percent bill increase for
residential customers. 138  Price freeze service had ended in 2003 for
PEPCO and Connectiv, and these utilities had previously procured
roughly half of their power needs in prior years in multi-year contracts.
The blend of these lower priced multi-year contracts with the outcome of




133. Report, supra note 108, at 4.
134. Id. at 3 ("The likely source of these increased prices was a run up in natural gas prices
following the catastrophic impacts of Hurricanes Rita and Katrina on the nation's oil and natural gas
infrastructure. Natural gas-fired electric plants comprise a significant portion of the fleet of electric
generation serving customers in Maryland.").
135. Id. at4.
136. Id. at 12 ("[T]he price freeze components of Maryland's implementation of industry re-
structuring meant that the newly-licensed suppliers could not compete with the prices available from
the utilities during the years of the price freeze periods. That initial stumbling block, combined with
the relatively high costs of marketing to small volume customers, constrained the development of
retail markets for small customers during the price freeze periods.").
137. Id. at 4.
138. Id.
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the 2005-2006 procurement produced smaller increases in the 35 to 39
percent range for typical residential customers.1
39
Facing the July 1 expiration of rate caps for BGE, and facing an an-
ticipated 72 percent increase in rates for BGE's residential customers, on
March 6, 2006, the Maryland PSC issued Order No. 80638 (March 6 Or-
der). This order adopted a payment plan option for BGE residential
customers. The plan adopted by the March 6 Order was an opt-out plan
(i.e., customers had to take affirmative action to decline to participate in
the plan), included interest charges at five percent and was to last two or
three years in duration. In April 2006, BGE filed a comprehensive rate
stabilization plan with the Maryland PSC that allowed BGE's residential
electric customers to reduce and defer the pending July 1 rate increase.
The rate stabilization plan was optional; it would allow BGE customers
to select or "opt-in" to a rate stabilization program that would reduce the
initial increase and spread out the remainder. Those customers opting in
would see a rate increase of 19.4 percent on July 1.140
In June 2006, the Maryland state government held a special session
to deal with the electricity price crisis. Governor Ehrlich suggested im-
plementing a rate stabilization plan with utilities that would allow cus-
tomers to limit the rate increase exposure to 15 percent in 2006, to 25
percent in 2007, and market level in January 2008. Under the Gover-
nor's proposal, opting in to this plan would allow customers to repay the
deferred charges interest-free. As part of the special session, on June 14,
2006, the Maryland General Assembly considered and passed SB 1.
Among other things, SB 1 attempted to terminate (i.e., remove) the in-
cumbent members of the Maryland PSC and attempted to require that
their successors be appointed from a list of names provided by the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate. 141 SB 1 would
also phase in the 72 percent rate increase for BGE and eliminate the
139. Id.
140. Investigation into a Residential Electric Rate Stabilization and Market Transitions Plan
for Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Case No. 9052, Order No. 80764 (Md. PSC Apr. 28,
2006). On April 28, 2006, the Maryland PSC issued Order No. 80764, which modified the March 6
Order to make it an opt-in plan, to treat interest as a deferred asset, and to extend the plan to three
and four years. Id On May 30, 2006, however, the Baltimore City Circuit Court issued an order
vacating, reversing, and remanding Order No. 80764. In re Commission 's Investigation into a Resi-
dential Electric Rate Stabilization and Market Transitions Plan for Baltimore Gas and Electric
Company, Case No. 24-C-06-003976 (Md. City Cir. Ct. May 30, 2006), available at
http://www.baltocts.state.md.us/about/publications/opinions/PSC_StayOrder.pdf. In response, on
June 2, 2006, the Maryland PSC instructed BGE to implement the March 6 Order. Press Release,
Public Service Commission (June 2, 2006) (on file with the Public Service Commission).
141. Schisler v. State, 938 A.2d 57, 60-61 (Md. 2007).
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People's Counsel. 142 On June 22, 2006, Governor Ehrlich vetoed the
bill. In his veto message, Governor Ehrlich stated that the "General As-
sembly continues to use the PSC as a scapegoat for the failure of the
1999 deregulation law" even though "PSC followed the deregulation law
enacted by the General Assembly in 1999 and procedures established by
prior PSC members in 2003.' ' 4
On June 23, 2006, the General Assembly resumed its Special Ses-
sion and voted to override the Governor's veto as an "emergency bill" to
take effect immediately. 144 Chairman Schisler and the Maryland PSC
filed a Complaint for a Declaratory Judgment and Temporary Restrain-
ing Order in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on June 26, 2006, and
sought to stay Sections 12 and 22 of SB 1, which terminated the commis-
sioners' appointments from taking effect. 145 On June 28, 2006, the Cir-
cuit Court denied relief, and the matter was promptly appealed to the
Maryland Court of Appeals. 146 In a decision issued September 14, 2006,
the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that the state legislature could not
dismiss members of the Maryland PSC and nominate its own slate.
147
According to the ruling, the provision "was an unconstitutional usurpa-
tion by the legislature of an executive power.' ' 148 The court's decision
did not address the other provisions of SB 1, which were not presented in
the case.
The phase-in provisions of SB 1 limited the July 1, 2006 rate in-
crease to 15 percent and required all BGE residential customers to par-
ticipate in a rate stabilization plan. That plan deferred their payment of
the difference between the 15 percent increase and the 72 percent in-
crease from July 2006 through May 2007.149 On June 1, 2007, standard
offer service rates for residential customers were required to go to market
rates. 150 SB I further required customers to pay back the deferred amount
over a period often years, with interest. 151
142. Id. at 60.
143. Letter from Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr. to senate President Thomas V. Mike Miller,
Jr. (June 22, 2006) (on file with author), available at http://thetentacle.com/docs/sb I .pdf.
144. Schisler, 938 A.2d at 60.
145. Id. at 59-60.
146. Id. at 60.
147. Id.
148. See Schisler v. State, 907 A.2d 175, 202 (Md. 2006).
149. 2006 (Special Session) Md. Laws ch. 5 (amending various provisions of the Public Utility
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The fourth largest utility operating in Maryland, Allegheny Power,
has a price cap that is scheduled to expire on December 31, 2008.152 In
December 2006, the Maryland PSC opened a proceeding to investigate
measures for avoiding rate shocks when Allegheny's rate caps expire. In
commencing the proceeding, the PSC observed that "since 1999, the
price of electricity for [Allegheny Power] customers has remained well
below market levels ... while the cost of electric utility service, particu-
larly the cost of fossil fuels to generate electricity has increased dramati-
cally." '153 The PSC expressed concern "about the magnitude of the po-
tential price increases affecting residential customers all at once."'
15 4
Under the transition plan approved by the Maryland PSC for Alle-
gheny Power on March 30, 2007, customers were offered the choice of
participating in an optional program. The program offered customers the
choice to transition to the higher market rates on January 1, 2009, by
means of a series of surcharges and credits which moderate the impact of
moving from capped to market rates.155 Under the plan, on March 31,
2007, Allegheny's residential customers would begin to pay a distribu-
tion surcharge that would increase rates by about 15 percent, followed by
an additional 15 percent increase on January 1, 2008.156 Upon expiration
of the rate caps and the move to market-based generation on January 1,
2009, the surcharge would convert to a credit; funds collected through
the surcharge in 2007 and 2008 would be returned to customers as a
credit on their electric bills and reduce the impact of the rate cap expira-
tion. 157 These credits would continue until December 31, 2010.158
The rate increase borne by BGE's residential customers, however,
was limited to 15 percent under SB 1, rather than the 72 percent increase
that would have resulted from full implementation of the Standard Offer
service market rates. 159 On March 8, 2007, the Maryland PSC initiated
152. See Plan, supra note 5.
153. Residential Electric Rate Stabilization and Market Transition Plan for the Potomac Edison
Company, Case No. 9091, Order No. 81130, at I (Md. PSC November 11, 2006). In a press release
issued by Allegheny Power at the time it announced its proposed rate stabilization and transition
plan, the utility reported that since the beginning of 2001, coal prices had increased 43 percent and
natural gas prices had increased 71 percent. In the absence of rate caps, customers' bills would have
changed periodically to reflect the true cost of providing electric service. Press Release, Business
Wire, Allegheny Power Proposes Transition Plan for Residential Rates in Maryland (Dec. 29, 2006)
(on file with Business Wire).
154. Id. at 2.




159. Baltimore Gas & Electric Company's Proposal to Implement a Rate Stabilization Plan
Pursuant to Section 7-548 of the Public Utility Companies Article and the Commission's Inquiry
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the BGE Transition Proceeding 160 to examine BGE's rates and a pro-
posed rate stabilization plan for June 1 to December 31, 2007. By the
time this proceeding commenced, both the Maryland PSC and the Mary-
land Governor's office had experienced personnel changes. Newly
elected Governor Martin O'Malley had issued a campaign pledge to
scrutinize conditions that resulted in the expected 72 percent rate in-
crease for BGE customers; he also appointed a new chairman and two
new members of the five-member PSC panel. 16
1
At the conclusion of the BGE Transition Proceeding, the Maryland
PSC issued an order that partly blamed former commissioners for failing
to control costs and blamed BGE for acting "passively.' 62  In its
May 23, 2007 decision, the PSC approved a 50 percent rate increase for
BGE's residential customers, representing the balance of the 72 percent
increase after reflecting the 15 percent increase allowed by SB 1 and
other modest credits included in SB 1.163 The PSC concluded that it had
"little choice but to approve the proposed increase" and observed that
continuing the "artificial" and "illegal rate caps" would "invit[e] costly
litigation with little chance of success.' 64  The PSC also observed that,
when the previous Commission approved settlements that extended the
capped rate period for another two years (or until July 1, 2006),165 "they
set the stage for possible rate shock when the caps were lifted by mask-
ing, for an additional two years, the impact of rising energy costs such as
into Factors Impacting Wholesale Electricity Prices, Case No. 9099, Order No. 81423 (Md. PSC
May 23, 2007) [hereinafter Proposal].
160. See id
161. Paul Adams, Rebuilt PSC Begins Hearings to Probe Electricity Rate Rise; Panel Also
Will Weigh BGE Plan to Phase in Future Increases, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 17, 2007, at DI.
162. Maryland PSC Approves 'With Reluctance' 50% BGE Hike, Blaming Old PSC, Utility,
ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, May 28, 2007, at 3-4. The Executive Summary states the following:
At several junctures, had the Commission taken different action to respond to emerging
market conditions and later addressed concerns raised by the General Assembly in Senate
Bill 1, it is possible that rates could have been lower than those we are asked to approve
in this proceeding. Similarly, BGE, which under the restructuring law essentially is rele-
gated to serving as a conduit of wholesale electricity prices in the provision of [standard
offer service], appeared to act passively in light of the same market conditions, rather
than proactively attempting to manage large rate increases that were evident on the hori-
zon while rate caps held rates back in check over the period of seven years from 1999 to
2006.
Proposal, supra note 159, at 4.
163. Proposal, supra note 159, at 3.
164. Id. at 2, 9. The PSC found there was "no legal basis to invalidate the process or results of
[the] procurements." Id. at 9.
165. The Maryland Restructuring Act authorized the PSC to enter into stipulations with the
Maryland utilities, and the settlement with BGE extended the rate cap an additional two years be-
yond the term contemplated in the Act. See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-505(d)(3) (2006).
In the case of PEPCO and Delmarva, for example, the rate caps expired on July 1, 2004.
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natural gas and coal which run generating plants."1 66 According to the
PSC's analysis, eastern coal prices increased 60 percent, and natural gas
prices increased 200 to 300 percent between 1999 and 2006. These en-
ergy commodity costs drove 75 to 90 percent of the annual wholesale
electricity prices. 161
The experience in Maryland provided a clear illustration of rate-cap
challenges: multi-year rate caps which temporarily insulated retail utility
customers from the increases in wholesale power costs, followed by the
dilemma of imposing massive rate increases on these customers upon the
expiration of the rate caps. The challenges were exacerbated in BGE's
case not only by its need to purchase 100 percent of its standard offer
service load at then-elevated wholesale market prices, but also its inabil-
ity to take advantage of the blending of staged purchases that lessened
the impact for PEPCO and Connectiv. Simply extending the "artificial"
and "illegal" rate caps was not an option, as acknowledged by the Mary-
land PSC in the BGE Transition Proceeding, because litigation likely
would have resulted, and BGE had a strong legal position. Through the
procurement process, the actual costs incurred by BGE to serve its retail
customers had been quantified: it was not a sustainable solution to deny
recovery of these costs through extension of the rate caps. BGE likely
would have prevailed on both a Takings Clause challenge and a Due
Process Clause challenge. 168 The solution ultimately implemented was to
phase in the undeniably necessary rate increase over a period of years,
which was accomplished by the phase-in provisions of SB 1 and the ad-
ditional measures adopted by the Maryland PSC in the BGE Transition
Proceeding.
B. Delaware
On March 31, 1999, the Electric Restructuring Act of 1999 (Dela-
ware Restructuring Act) was enacted. 169 Prior to restructuring, the gen-
eration, transmission, and distribution of electric power by investor-
owned utilities was fully regulated by the Delaware Public Service
Commission (Delaware PSC). 170 With restructuring, the generation of
electric power became deregulated, leaving only distribution services
166. Proposal, supra note 159, at 4-5.
167. Id. at 7.
168. Although the burden would be more difficult for BGE in the Takings Clause proceeding
for the reasons described earlier, the enormity of the wholesale price increases actually incurred by
BGE would have resulted in a strong evidentiary record of a confiscatory return.
169. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1001-19 (2006).
170. Electric Regulation in Delaware (Delaware PSC), http://depsc.delaware.gov/electric.shtml
(last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
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under the regulatory control of the Delaware PSC. The Delaware
Restructuring Act provided for rate caps for customers of Delmarva
Power & Light Company (Delmarva) and the Delaware Electric Coop-
erative.171 In addition, Delmarva residential customers received a 7.5
percent rate reduction. 172 In April 2001, the Delaware PSC approved a
proposed settlement in the merger of Potomac Electric Power Company
(PEPCO) and Delmarva Power. Under this settlement, Delmarva was
allowed to increase rates about one percent system-wide after Septem-
ber 30, 2003, and rates for Delmarva customers were frozen at these lev-
els until May 1, 2006.173
Rate caps expired for customers of the Delaware Electric Coopera-
tive on March 31, 2005.174 Rates for Delaware Electric Cooperative cus-
tomers increased about 6 to 8 percent upon the lifting of the caps and
increased further in 2007 upon the expiration of long-term purchased
power contracts.
175
Upon the expiration of Delmarva's rate cap on May 1, 2006, Del-
marva's rates for residential customers increased by approximately 59
percent. In response, the General Assembly passed a revision to the re-
structuring legislation entitled "The Electric Utilities Retail Supply Act
of 2006.' '176 The 2006 Delaware Act automatically enrolled (subject to
opt-out by customers) all of Delmarva's residential customers in an elec-
tric rate phase-in plan that allowed customers to spread the higher elec-
tricity costs over an extended period of time. 177 Under the phase-in plan,
rates increased 15 percent on May 1, 2006, 25 percent on January 1,
2007, and 17 percent on June 1, 2007. Beginning January 1, 2008,
customers began to pay back the deferred amount over a 17-month pe-
riod in monthly installments.
178
171. Id.
172. Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program, Overview of Low-Income
Restructuring Legislation and Implementation: Delaware (Jan. 2007),
http://liheap.ncat.org/dereg/states/delaware.htm.
173. Delmarva Power & Light Co., Connectiv Commc'ns, Inc., Potomac Elec. Power Co., and
New RC, Inc., for Permission to Transfer Control of Delmarva Power & Light Co., and Connectiv
Commc'ns, Inc., Docket No. 01-194, Order No. 5941 (Del. PSC Apr. 16, 2001), available at
http://depsc.delaware.gov/orders/5941 .pdf.
174. Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program, supra note 172.
175. Delaware PSC-FAQs, http://depsc.delaware.gov/faqs.shtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
176. Act of April 6, 2006, 143rd General Assembly (2006) (2006 Delaware Act), available
at http://legis.delaware.gov/lis/lisl43.nsf/vwLegislation/HB+6?Opendocument (follow "Legis.doc"
hyperlink).
177. Id. § 3.
178. Id. § 5.
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Additional provisions of the 2006 Delaware Act were intended to
stabilize long-term pricing in the Delmarva service territory. 7 9 The
provisions allowed distribution companies to enter into long and short-
term supply contracts, own and operate generation facilities, build gen-
eration and transmission facilities, make investments in demand-side re-
sources, and take any other Commission-approved action to diversify the
retail load supply. 180 Furthermore, the 2006 Delaware Act required Del-
marva to conduct Integrated Resource Planning for a forward-looking
10-year period. 181 As part of the initial planning process, Delmarva was
also required to file a proposal to obtain long-term supply contracts.
182
The proposal required Delmarva to include a Request for Proposal (RFP)
for the construction of new generation resources within Delaware. 1
83
The experience in Delaware was very similar to Maryland's in
terms of the magnitude of the necessary rate increase (59 percent in-
crease for Delmarva versus a 72 percent increase for BGE) and the ulti-
mate legislative solution (a multi-year phase-in of the rate increases nec-
essary to recover the higher wholesale power costs). As in Maryland, it
would not have been a legally sustainable solution to extend the duration
of Delmarva's price caps, given the evidence of the higher wholesale
power costs actually incurred by Delmarva in serving its retail custom-
ers. Under the phase-in adopted in the 2006 Delaware Act, Delmarva
was ultimately made whole for the higher power costs through custom-
ers' payment of deferred amounts. Other provisions of the 2006 Dela-
ware Act were intended to provide a long-term solution to the underlying
procurement issue and eliminate exclusive reliance on periodic procure-
ments in the wholesale markets by essentially restoring the vertically
integrated utility and by permitting Delmarva to enter into long-term
contracts and construct utility-owned generation.
C. Virginia
In March 1999, the Virginia Electric Utility Restructuring Act (SB
1269) passed the General Assembly and was signed into law by the
Governor. 184 The Virginia Restructuring Act provided for deregulation
of generation by January 1, 2002, and a phase-in of consumer choice be-
179. Synopsis of 2006 Delaware Act, Delaware General Assembly, available at
http://legis.delaware.gov/lis/lisl 43.nsf/vwLegislation/HB+6?Opendocument.
180. Act of April 6, 2006, supra note 176, § 6(b).
181. Id. § 6(c).
182. Id. § 6(d).
183. Id.
184. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-56-567. (2007) (Virginia Restructuring Act).
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tween January 1, 2002, and January 1, 2004.185 For those customers not
switching electricity providers and remaining with their incumbent util-
ity, rates were capped through July 2007.186
In the annual report to the Legislative Transition Task Force in Au-
gust 2001, the Virginia State Corporation Commission (Virginia SCC)
reported on the implementation of pilot programs for retail access com-
menced by Dominion Virginia Power (DVP) and American Electric
Power (AEP) in the fall of 2000 and by Rappahannock Electric Coopera-
tive (Rappahonnock) in January 2001.187 According to the report, "the
pilot programs did not attract the anticipated level of interest from either
customers or suppliers."'
188
In its August 2002 report, the Virginia SCC stated that only 2,500
residential consumers and twenty-four small commercial customers were
using an alternative supplier. Residential customers who had switched
were customers of a competitive provider offering "green" power at a
price higher than the incumbent utility's price-to-compare. 189 The report
observed that competitive providers "view the Virginia retail market as
currently providing little economic incentive for entry."
'190
In its 2003 status report, the Virginia SCC recommended suspend-
ing restructuring in the state.' 9' The report expressed "substantial doubt
as to the ability of retail electric competition to provide, at the present
time, lower prices for Virginians than would have been charged under
the traditional regulation of the industry."' 92
In April 2004, Governor Mark Warner signed SB 651 which ex-
tended the retail electricity rate cap through 2010.193 The bill also
allowed DVP to hold its fuel rate at its present level until July 1, 2007,
after which one adjustment was permitted for the three-and-a-half year
185. See id. § 56-577.
186. See id. § 56-582.
187. Dev. of a Competitive Retail Market for Elec. Generation within the Commonwealth
of Virginia, Part I, Executive Summary (Va. SCC Aug. 31, 2001), available at
http://www.scc.virginia.gov/caseinfo/pue/case/statusreportpart lexecsum.pdf.
188. Id. at 1.
189. Dev. of a Competitive Retail Market for Elec. Generation within the Commonwealth
of Virginia, Part I, Executive Summary (Va. SCC Aug. 31, 2002), available at
http://www.scc.virginia.gov/caseinfo/reports/02 lttf exsuml 1.pdf.
190. Id.
191. Dev. of a Competitive Retail Market for Elec. Generation within the Commonwealth
of Virginia, Introduction (Va. SCC Aug. 29, 2003), available at
http://www.scc.virginia.gov/caseinfo/reports/2003_1.pdf.
192. Id. at v.
193. Act of April 14, 2004, 2004 S.B. 651, § 56-249.6(C) (2004), available at
http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp5O4.exe?041+ful+CHAP0827 (amending various sections of VA.
CODE ANN. § 56).
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period ending December 31, 2010.194 Also, the bill expanded local gov-
ernment options to form buying groups to save money on electricity for
their citizens and set up procedures to make it easier for many large
commercial and industrial consumers to switch electricity suppliers. 9 5
On the heels of the recent experience in Maryland and Delaware
with regard to the challenges associated with expiring rate caps, in its
September 2006 report the Virginia SCC began to express concern about
the impact of expiring rate caps on electricity prices in Virginia. The
report noted that because the Virginia Restructuring Act was enacted in
1999, "electric utility customers in Virginia have been insulated, to some
degree, from changes in electric charges that would otherwise apply in
the absence of the base rate caps which are an integral component of Vir-
ginia's restructuring program. ' 96 According to the report, the effect of
the base rate caps "has kept retail prices for most Virginia consumers
from increasing precipitously despite escalating prices for electricity in
wholesale markets."'1 97 The report noted the experience of retail electric
customers in neighboring states (Maryland and Delaware) which "faced
precipitous electricity cost increases as applicable rate caps have ex-
pired." 198 According to the report, "the basic problem is that today's pre-
vailing wholesale prices are much higher than those envisioned at the
onset of industry restructuring."' 99
The Legislative Transition Task Force, established under the Vir-
ginia Restructuring Act, began to study the implications of the expiration
of capped rates at the end of 2011.200 In its December 2006 meeting, the
Task Force considered a variety of proposals, including a proposal to
extend the rate caps and other modifications to the restructuring re-
gime.20' When the Virginia legislature convened in January 2007, a
number of competing proposals emerged. State Senator Thomas K.
Norment introduced legislation supported by DVP that would replace the
194. Id.
195. Id. § 56-589.
196. Dev. of a Competitive Retail Market for Elec. Generation within the Commonwealth of
Virginia, Introduction, at i (Va. SCC Sept. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.scc.virginia.gov/caseinfo/reports/2006_intro.pdf.
197. Id.
198. Id. at ii.
199. Id.
200. Greg Edwards, Will Virginia Face Future Shock on Electricity Bills?: Lawmakers Will
Study Deregulation After Big Increases in Md., Del., RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 29, 2006,
at B9.
201. See Greg Edwards, Panel to Hear Utility Proposals: Extending Rate Caps, Revising De-
regulation, Encouraging Renewables Addressed in Bills, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 16,
2006, at B 13.
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state's deregulated electric power market with a hybrid form of regula-
tion. According to Senator Norment's Bill (Norment Bill) Virginia SCC
would review electric utilities' rates every two years and would allow
utilities to keep all profits up to a three percent return above national av-
erages over utilities' long-term bond costs. 20 2 Additionally, the rate caps
would terminate at the end of 2008, rather than at the end of 2010.203 A
competing proposal offered by House Delegate Harvey Morgan would
have ended the current cap on rates on December 31, 2007, and would
have required the Virginia SCC to reset electric utility rates at that point
based on the utility's cost of service or the traditional form of rate regula-
tion.
204
Thereafter, the Virginia Attorney General's Office facilitated a
compromise between the competing proposals and among the various
stakeholder groups.205 The outcome of that process was a bill sponsored
by House Delegate Clarke N. Hogan, H.B. 3068 (Hogan Bill), which
would have stripped much of the rate-setting flexibility from the Virginia
SCC by enacting formulae for rate floors and requirements for rate
changes.20 6 The Hogan Bill would have set a ceiling on returns that a
utility would be allowed to earn at two percentage points above the na-
tional average return on equity earned by regulated utilities.20 7
The final bill that emerged, SB 1416, was signed by Governor Tim
Kaine in April 2007, and included several amendments that the Governor
208had required. The bill advanced the scheduled expiration of the
capped rate period from December31, 2010, to December 31, 2008.209
The bill also established a new mechanism for regulating the rates of
investor-owned electric utilities and limited the ability of most consum-
ers to purchase electric generation service from competing suppliers.
202. See Greg Edwards & Pamela Stallsmith, Committee Passes Electricity Bill: Senate Meas-
ure Would Create Hybrid Form of Regulation, Encourage Building New Plants, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Feb. 6, 2007, at B7.
203. See Dominion Puts Forward Plan for Virginia to Return to Cost-of-Service Rate Regula-
tion, GLOBAL POWER REPORT, Jan. 4, 2007, at 1.
204. Debate Kicks off on Virginia's Retail Program with Effort to Negotiate, GLOBAL POWER
REPORT, Jan. 15, 2007, at 1.
205. Chris Flores, Dominion OKs Compromise with Virginia: The Utility Has Agreed to Re-
store More Authority to the State Regarding Profit Margins, NEWPORT NEWS DAILY PRESS, Jan. 31,
2007.
206. Greg Edwards, Legislators Agree Deregulation Failed: Deregulation's Failure Apparent;
Next Approach to Electric Restructuring is What is at Issue, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 2,
2007, at C6.
207. Id.
208. See Virginia Governor Amends State's Rereg Bill to Allow Competitive Bids for New
Generation, GLOBAL POWER REPORT, Mar. 29, 2007, at 22.
209. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-582(F) (2007).
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The ratemaking procedure requires the Virginia SCC to conduct a rate
case for investor-owned utilities in 2009, and thereafter for the rates,
terms, and conditions of each utility biennially.210 In these biennial re-
views, the SCC is to set a utility's basic allowable rate of return on eq-
uity at a level at least equal to the average of the rates of return allowed
for other, similar utilities in the southeast.2t' With respect to the cus-
tomer's ability to purchase generation services from competing provid-
ers, the bill provided that after the capped rate period ends, only custom-
ers with annual demand in excess of five megawatts will be permitted to
shop.212
Stakeholders in Virginia obviously benefited from examining the
earlier experience of Maryland and Delaware with the undesirable transi-
tion issues that occurred at the expiration of multi-year rate caps. Al-
though one option considered in Virginia was to extend the rate caps be-
yond 2010, the Virginia SCC's analysis highlighted the problem with
continuing to insulate customers from the price increases that were oc-
curring in the wholesale markets. Rather than allow this "mismatch"
between retail prices and wholesale costs to continue until 2011, and run
the risk of "transition" rate increases even larger than those experienced
in Maryland and Delaware, the solution in Virginia was to accelerate the
termination of the rate caps, and to return to a form of cost-based rate
regulation under which retail customers would receive the signals of
higher prices in the wholesale markets. How this plan ultimately plays
out will be determined when the Virginia utilities undergo their required
rate case review in 2009.
D. Illinois
In December 1997, the Illinois legislature passed H.B. 362, "The
Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Act of 1997" (Illinois
Restructuring Act).21 3 The Illinois Restructuring Act provided for rate
cuts of fifteen percent for the residential customers of the state's two
largest utilities, Commonwealth Edison (ComEd) and Ameren's Illinois
Power subsidiary (AmerenIP), effective August 1998, followed by an
additional five percent rate reduction in May 2002.214 Smaller utilities
were required to phase in five percent reductions by May 2002.2 5 The
210. See id. § 56-585.1.
211. See id. § 56-585.1(A)(2)(b).
212. Id. § 56-577(A)(3).
213. 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-101-130 (2007) (Illinois Restructuring Act).
214. Id. at 5/16-111(b).
215. Id.
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Illinois Restructuring Act also required retail access for commercial and
industrial customers to choose their electricity provider by October 1999.
All customers, including residential, were able to choose their generation
supplier by May 2002.216 The Act also imposed a ten-year freeze on
electric rates through January 1, 2007.217
In July 1999, SB 24 was enacted to amend the Illinois Restructuring
Act. The amendment accelerated the date for the transition to customer
choice. The first third of commercial and industrial consumers would
have retail access by October 1, 1999, the second third by June 1, 2000,
and the final third by October 1, 2000. As of January 1, 2001, all com-
mercial and industrial customers were eligible for retail access to com-
petitive suppliers. In addition, the required five percent rate reduction
for residential customers was accelerated by seven months, to October 1,
2001.
During the first two years of the restricted environment in Illinois,
the results concerning customers' exercise of their competitive options
were somewhat mixed.2t 8 The majority of customers that switched to
alternative suppliers were in ComEd's territory, while the downstate
utilities were experiencing very low customer participation levels. 219 The
216. See id. at 5/16-111.5.
217. Id. at 5/16-111.5A. The rate freeze period was meant to provide a transition period
from a completely regulated industry to a market-based industry. Post 2006 Initiative: Final
Staff Report to the Commission, at 1 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n Dec. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.icc.illinois.gov/downloads/public/en/041203ecPostRptFinal.doc.
218. In December 2000, the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) issued an update on the
status of competition in the State.
219. About 12% of ComEd's eligible customers representing about half of the company's
load had switched to alternative suppliers. Illinois Restructuring Active,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/illinois.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
6.9% of AmerenIP's customers had switched, while AmerenCIPS had 6.8% of its customers
switch. Id. Illinois Power (AmerenIP) is a subsidiary of Ameren; Central Illinois Public Service
Company (AmerenCIPS) is also a subsidiary of Ameren. Ameren Wikipedia Entry,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ameren (last visited Mar. 1, 2008). The ICC Report stated that a
lack of competition could be due to a need for more suppliers, electricity shortages, inefficient
transmission system, a lack of uniform interconnection standards, or the lack of restructuring
activity in the surrounding states. Assessment of Competition in the Illinois Electric Industry
in 2002 (Il. Comm. Comm'n Apr. 2003), available at
http://www.icc.illinois.gov/downloads/public/en/030513garptl 6120.doc.
In the ICC's April 2001 "Assessment of Retail and Wholesale Market Competition in the Illi-
nois Electric Industry," the commission concluded that only in the ComEd service territory were
switching rates and supplier activity high in 2000. Illinois Restructuring Active, supra, note 19. In
the CoinEd service territory, approximately 22% of eligible customers had switched to delivery
services, and 62% of eligible usage had switched from bundled to delivery services. Assessment of
Competition in the Illinois Electric Industry. At the end of 2000, about eight suppliers were active in
the ComEd service territory, although only three or four suppliers had acquired a fairly significant
number of customers. Id. In the downstate territories, by contrast, few suppliers were operating. Id.
In its April 2002 "Assessment of Retail and Wholesale Market Competition in the Illinois Electric
Industry in 2001," the ICC reported that 14% of the load eligible for delivery services had switched
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response to this lack of success was SB 2081, designed to provide time
for the competitive market to develop in Illinois by extending the utility
rate freeze and mandatory transition charges for an additional two years
in June 2002.22°
In August 2002, the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) released
the Report of Chairman's Summer 2002 Roundtable Discussion Re: Im-
plementation of the Illinois Restructuring Act. The report stated that
"there is absolutely no competition (or choice) for retail residential elec-
tric customers, and it is unlikely competition (or choice) will be available
for these customers for the next several years."22' The report further
stated that commercial and industrial retail customers had limited access
to alternative retail electric suppliers outside of the CornEd service terri-
tory. 22 2
In the absence of the increased competition that was expected to
develop, the ICC began to consider how to price electricity when the
transition period ended and the rate caps expired on January 1, 2007.223
As a result of the Illinois Restructuring Act, CornEd and the Ameren
utilities became distribution-only utilities that sold or spun off their gen-
erating assets to affiliates. 224 In other words, CoinEd and the Ameren
utilities could only serve their retail customers with electricity by enter-
ing into wholesale contracts with other companies. 225 The initial whole-
sale power contracts that CornEd and the Ameren companies entered into
expired with the end of the Illinois Restructuring Act's mandatory transi-
tion period on January 1, 2007.226 The ICC staff issued a report to the
ICC on December 2, 2004, containing recommendations regarding the
procurement of electricity by Illinois utilities after the end of the
transition period.22 v In February 2005, both CornEd and Ameren filed
proposals for auction processes to determine prices that would be passed
to a retail electric supplier and that eighteen suppliers were licensed retail electric suppliers in 2001.
Id.
220. Act of June 7, 2002, Pub. Act 92-0537, 2001 I11. Laws 537 (2002).
221. ICC, REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN'S SUMMER 2002 ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION RE:
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ILLINOIS RESTRUCTURING ACT.
222. Id.
223. Illinois Commerce Commission, Post 2006 Initiative: Final Staff Report to
the Commission, at 1 (Dec. 2, 2004) available at
http://www.icc.illinois.gov/downloads/public/en/041203ecPostRptFinal.doc.
224. See The September 2006 Illinois Auction, Post-Auction Public Report of the Staff, at 4
(ICC Dec. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Post Auction Report], available at http://www.icc.illinois.gov
/downloads/public/en/PostAuctionPublicReportAuctionmanager.pdf.
225. Id. at 4-5.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 4 .
Seattle University Law Review
on to their customers after conclusion of the transition period.228  In
January 2006, in the Procurement Dockets, the ICC found that the best
option available for ComEd and Ameren to acquire new wholesale power
contracts for delivery starting January 2007 would be an open auction
where all bids from competing suppliers would be evaluated uniformly
on the basis of price.229
The first auction was held in September 2006. As a result of the
auction, the rates for most residential electricity consumers were ex-
pected to increase significantly on January 1, 2007. According to the
Staff Audit Report, ComEd's rates would increase by 21 percent,230
AmerenIP's rates would increase by 37 percent, AmerenCIPS' rates
would increase by 36 percent, and Ameren CILCO's rates would in-
231crease by 53 percent.
In response to the auction results, lawmakers proposed an extension
of the rate caps through the year 2010. In February 2006, H.B. 5766 was
introduced in the House to amend the Illinois Restructuring Act.232 This
bill provided for an extension of the mandatory transition period.233 Fur-
thermore, the bill prohibited the ICC from taking certain actions prior to
2010 with respect to (1) initiating, authorizing, or ordering any change
by way of increase in an electric utility's rates, or (2) approving an appli-
cation for a merger, imposing a condition requiring any filing for an in-
crease, decrease, or change in or other review of an electric utility's
rates, or enforcing such a condition.234 In October 2006, H.B. 5766 was
approved by a House committee.
235
Debt rating agencies downgraded both ComEd and Ameren in re-
sponse to the possible rate freeze action.236 Standard & Poor's Ratings
228. See Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket No. 05-0159 (Feb. 25, 2005) (proposal),
available at http://www.icc.illinois.gov/downloads/public/edocket/161341.pdf; see Suspended
Supplemental Information for Ameren (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://icc.illinois.gov/e-
Docket/docketnumber05-160.
229. See ICC, ORDER - FINAL FOR AMEREN (Jan. 24, 2006), available at
http://icc.illinois.gov/e-Docket/docketnumber05-160. Ameren proposed what is known as a "verti-
cal tranche multi-round descending clock auction" for purposes of acquiring power and energy after
the end of the transition period on January 1, 2007. See id. at 5.
230. For residential customers without space heating.
231. See Post-Auction Public Report, supra note 224, at v.
232. Exelon Prepared to do Battle in Court if Illinois Lawmakers Extend Rate Freeze,
ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Oct. 30, 2006, at 7.
233. Id.
234. 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-111 (a) (2007).
235. Illinois Rate Freeze Extension Bill Approved by House Panel; Senate Action Uncertain,
ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Oct. 16, 2006, at 1.
236. Id. On October 5, 2006, Standard & Poor's Ratings downgraded CoinEd two notches,
downgraded Ameren and its utility units, and kept the utilities on Credit Watch Negative. On Octo-
ber 10, Fitch Ratings put Ameren on Rating Watch Negative, and Moody's Investors Service put
Ameren, AmerenCILCO, AmerenCIPS, AmerenUE, and ComEd on review for downgrade. Id.
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indicated that "if the legislation is passed, S&P will lower its ratings on
the Illinois utilities into the B category. 237 ComEd promised to "mount
a vigorous court battle" if Illinois lawmakers passed the rate freeze legis-
lation.238 ComEd's legal challenge was based on both Due Process
Clause and Takings Clause claims. 239 Ameren, for its part, indicated that
it had hired bankruptcy lawyers in anticipation of the impacts of the Illi-
nois rate freeze, "which would drive the company's utilities there into
bankruptcy as soon as February." Without a rate increase, Ameren
claimed its Illinois utilities would lose $2.5 million per day. As a result,
Ameren would be downgraded to "junk" status and would not be able to
buy electricity or natural gas.24°
The 2006 legislative session ended without resolution of the rate
freeze issue. On November 30, the state senate passed a plan offered by
senate President Emil Jones which provided for a three-year phase-in of
rate increases. Under the legislation, amended House Bill 2197, rates
would have gone up 7 percent in both 2007 and 2008 and 8 percent in
2009, with any additional costs recovered, without interest, over a three-
year period starting in 20 10.241 The House had passed a different bill by
a 65-33 vote. This bill, H.B.607, would have extended the existing rate
242freeze by three years.
In December 2006, the ICC approved a plan to phase in Ameren's
and ComEd's rate hikes. The planned program would allow most
Ameren customers the option to reduce their rate hike to a maximum of
13.25 percent for each of the next three years (2007-2009) and defer the
additional amount to a three-year repayment period beginning in 20 10.243
The program would also allow ComEd's residential customers to reduce
their rate hike to a maximum of 10 percent for each of the next three
237. Id.
238. Exelon Prepared to do Battle in Court if Illinois Lawmakers Extend Rate Freeze,
ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Oct. 30, 2006, at 7. John Rowe, Chairman, President and CEO of Exelon,
ComEd's parent, stated that "ComEd's legal team already has all the necessary papers prepared for
legal challenge" if the General Assembly approves HB 5766. Id.
239. Telephone interview with Darryl M. Bradford, Senior Vice President and General Coun-
sel, Commonwealth Edison Company (Oct. 29, 2007).
240. Id.
241. Illinois Legislators Adjourn Veto Session Stalemated over ComEd/Ameren Rate Issue,
ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEKLY, Dec. 4, 2006, at 19.
242. Id.
243. See ICC Resolves Remaining Issues on 2007 Electricity Rates, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 20,
2006.
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years (2007-2009) and to defer the additional amount to a three-year re-
payment period beginning in 2010.2
44
In a brief legislative session in early January 2007, the Illinois
House approved S. 1714, which would extend the rate caps by an addi-
tional three years and also roll-back the rate increases threatening Illinois
customers at the time.245 The bill passed in the House, but the measure
was not considered by the senate.246 The regular 2007 session convened
on February 6, and shortly thereafter, the House passed the rate freeze
extension bill again.247 Standard & Poor's Ratings Services indicated
that its debt rating on ComEd's first mortgage bonds remained on Cred-
itWatch with negative implications and stated that "[i]f widespread sup-
port for a statewide electric freeze surfaces in the senate, making passage
of a rate-freeze bill all but certain, [it] could lower ComEd's ratings, per-
haps precipitously. '248 The senate passed its version of a three-year rate
freeze bill, SB 1592, on April 20, 2007.249 SB 1592 also provided for
rolling back electric rates to their 2006 levels for at least a year, and pre-
vented CornEd and Ameren from shutting off power to non-paying resi-
dential customers until December 1, 2007.25 o
The stakes changed later in the spring when House Speaker Mi-
chael Madigan began to propose a tax on electric generation. Under his
plan, a tax of $70,000 per megawatt of nameplate capacity would be im-
posed on most generation facilities in Illinois. This would cost Exelon
Generation, a ComEd affiliate, about $775 million annually.25' An
amendment sponsored by State Representative George Scully included
the generator tax in SB 1592.252 In negotiations, ComEd and Ameren
responded by offering $500 million to help customers pay electric bills;
244. Illinois Commerce Commission Approves Rate Phase-In Plans for CornEd, Ameren,
ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEKLY, Dec. 25, 2006, at 21.
245. CUB Applauds House Vote on Rate Freeze Extension, Urges Senate to Send Bill to Gov-
ernor for OK, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 7, 2007.
246. Id.; Rowe Says Illinois Stalemate Could Endure; Merrill Sees that as an Acceptable Out-
come, ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEKLY, Jan. 20, 2007, at 2.
247. See CoinEd: House Passage of Rate Freeze Extension Threatens Reliable Electric Service
in Illinois, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 6, 2007.
248. S&P, Commonwealth Edison's 'BBB'-Rated $325M Bonds Remain on Watch Neg,
Mar. 16, 2007.
249. Ameren Says Illinois Senate Legislation is Unconstitutional and Not in Best Interest of
Illinois: Immediate Relief to Electric Customers at Risk, PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 20, 2007. CornEd was
exempted from the legislation under a "rare parliamentary move" by Senate President Emil Jones,
but CornEd was re-inserted when the measure was sent to the House. Illinois Legislature Considers
Generation Tax as Overtime Session Looms, ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, May 28, 2007, at 1.
250. Adriana Colindres, House Panel Puts CoinEd in Rate Freeze, ST. J.-REG (SPRINGFIELD,
ILL.), Apr. 27, 2007.
251. Illinois Legislature Considers Generation Tax as an Overtime Session Looms, ELECTRIC
UTILITY WEEK, May 28, 2007, at 1.
252. Id.
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ComEd's share would be $300 million and Ameren's share would be
$200 million. 53 The amended SB 1592 was approved by a House
committee in late May 2007.254 State Senator Gary Forby, the sponsor of
SB 1592, stated that an acceptable negotiated settlement would be pref-
erable to passing a freeze bill and then "spending the next three years in
court since CoinEd and Ameren have vowed to appeal any such legisla-
tion. 255
The months of negotiation among the utilities, senate President
Emil Jones, House Speaker Mike Madigan, and Attorney General Lisa
Madigan resulted in a comprehensive statewide settlement announced on
July 24, 2007. The Illinois Power Agency Act 256 (Power Agency Act)
was signed by Governor Rod Blagojevich on August 28, 2007. The
Power Agency Act provided approximately one billion dollars in rate
relief over four years for residential and certain non-residential electric
257customers.  Approximately $540 million of the rate relief was made
available during 2007, with the remaining amount to be provided in
2008, 2009, and 20 10.258 Exelon Generation provided $747 million of
the funding, Ameren provided $150 million, CoinEd provided $53 mil-
lion, Midwest Generation and Dynegy each provided $25 million, and
MidAmerican Energy Company contributed $1 million.259 Of the one
billion dollars of relief, $488 million was allocated to CornEd customers,
while the Ameren utilities received about $250 million.
260
In addition to rate relief, the Power Agency Act established a new
regulatory regime to oversee the utility power procurement process in
Illinois, including the creation of the Illinois Power Agency, a new state
agency to oversee a competitive power procurement process.261  The
agency will retain a procurement administrator that will manage an alter-
native competitive process for procurement on behalf of the utilities'
residential and small business customers.262 The alternative procurement
process will include competitive requests for proposals and will direct
253. Id.
254. Illinois General Assembly Fails to Resolve Electric Rate Relief Issue, Heads for Overtime,
ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, June 4, 2007, at 7.
255. Id.
256. Pub. Act 95-481, 2007 Il1. Laws 481 (2007) [hereinafter Power Agency Act].
257. CoinEd to Participate in Comprehensive, Statewide Settlement of Electric Rate Debate,





261. Power Agency Act, supra note 257, § 1-15.
262. Id. § 1-70.
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the purchase of power in separate base load, intermediate, and peaking
blocks beginning in 2008.263 In addition, the agency will house a
resource development function that could build power plants and sell
output to Illinois municipalities and CO-OPS.264 The Power Agency Act
also imposes new energy efficiency and demand response requirements
on electric utilities and provides for new renewable portfolio stan-
dards.265
The rating agencies reacted favorably to the enactment of the Power
Agency Act. Standard & Poor's announced in late July that, upon enact-
ment of the law, it would remove the Ameren utilities as well as Exelon
and its CoinEd subsidiary from the "CreditWatch with negative implica-
tions" category266 and affirmed this action in late August.267 Fitch Rat-
ings similarly affirmed and removed Ameren and its Illinois companies
(CILCO, CIPS and IP) from Rating Watch Negative on August 1,
2007,268 and upgraded various of ComEd's issuances in late Au-
gust 2007.269
The Illinois experience is noteworthy in several respects. First,
there was an actual legislative enactment of a rate freeze extension,
which would have extended the existing rate freezes by an additional
three years. The amount of the necessary rate increase to match whole-
sale costs with retail rates had been quantified through the procurement
process (requiring rate increases between 21 percent and 53 percent), and
the legislature was simply going to deny the utilities a forum for making
the case to increase retail rates to recover these costs. Second, the utili-
ties were prepared to mount their legal challenges to the rate freeze: a
Due Process Clause challenge was obvious and ComEd was prepared to
make it, along with a Takings Clause challenge. Ameren had already
"done the math" for its Takings Clause challenge: it would lose $2.5 mil-
lion per day under the rate freeze, and its bonds would quickly be down-
graded to 'junk" status. Third, the financial community confirmed the
financial irresponsibility of enacting a rate freeze by issuing warnings of
imminent downgrades of securities of affected utilities. Retail customers
263. Id. § 1-75.
264. Id. § 1-80.
265. Id. § 1-75.
266. Energy Central News, S&P: Ameren Corp. Avoids Rate Freeze with Rate Relief Pact;
Favorable for Creditworthiness, July 23, 2007; Energy Central News, S&P: Exelon Agreement that
Forestalls Rate Freeze in Illinois is Favorable for Credit, July 24, 2007.
267. Energy Central News, S&P: Exelon, Ameren Ratings Affirmed After Illinois Agreement
Becomes Law; Off Watch, Aug. 29, 2007.
268. Fitch Affirms and Removes Ameren and Illinois Subsidiaries from Rating Watch Negative,
BUSINESS WIRE, Aug. 1, 2007.
269. Fitch Upgrades Commonwealth Edison's IDR to 'BB+ 'from 'BB' on Illinois Rate Legis-
lation, BUSINESS WIRE, Aug. 29, 2007.
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would long bear the consequences of the higher borrowing costs that
would result from these downgrades, and the policymakers in Illinois
could not ignore these warnings.
Although the utilities had a very strong legal position with respect
to their rights to recover the higher wholesale power costs in retail rates,
it was the threat of a generation tax that broke the stalemate. Under the
Illinois Restructuring Act, ComEd and Ameren had sold or spun off their
generating assets to affiliates. While the regulated retail utilities bore the
impacts of the mismatch between wholesale power costs and retail elec-
tric rates, the unregulated generation affiliates of ComEd and Ameren
were reaping the benefits and profits associated with the higher whole-
sale prices. The generation tax proposed by House Speaker Madigan
would provide a way to capture a portion of these profits, and his pro-
posed tax of $70,000 per megawatt of nameplate capacity would raise
about $775 million annually from Exelon generation alone. This brought
the utilities to the bargaining table and forced an abandonment of the
promised Due Process and Takings Clause challenges. Ultimately, the
retail electric utilities were allowed to raise their rates to recover the
higher wholesale power costs, but the unregulated generating companies
operating in Illinois coughed up one billion dollars, of which $747 mil-
lion was provided by Exelon Generation, to help retail customers pay the
higher rates. Although the constitutional legal rights of the regulated
utilities were compelling, the Illinois political leaders had a trump card of
their own through their credible threat to impose a generation tax that
would peel away much of the profits derived from wholesale power
transactions. The compromises embodied in the Power Agency Act
ended the legislative deadlock and provided a long-term solution to the
underlying issue of power procurement in the restructured market.
E. Preliminary Activities in Other States
While the rate cap expiration issues have been addressed in Mary-
land, Delaware, Virginia, and Illinois, other states will soon be facing the
same issues. Policymakers in Ohio, for example, are exploring options
for dealing with rate caps that expire at the end of 2008. Pennsylvania
has taken affirmative steps to address the transition issues expected to
occur when its rate caps expire within the next two years, and New York
and Michigan are both considering legislative proposals that could roll
back restructuring efforts in these respective states. Maine is embarking
on a more limited rollback, while Montana has all but abandoned its
failed restructuring experiment. The controversial and somewhat notori-
ous experiences in Maryland and Illinois will certainly inform the proc-
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esses in these states as they move forward. Utilities in these states will
likely have Due Process and Takings Clause protections that may come
into play if rate cap extensions are proposed as a possible solution.
1. Ohio
After years of lobbying from electric utilities and many consumers,
on October 5, 1999, the Ohio General Assembly passed SB 3, which pro-
vided for restructuring of Ohio's electric-utility industry. The bill's goal
was to achieve retail competition with respect to the generation compo-
nent of electric service. 270 The Ohio Restructuring Law provided for a
transition period, termed the "market development period," during which
an electric utility's rates would be subject to certain regulatory require-
ments.271
During the market development period of January 1, 2001, through
December 31, 2005, rates were frozen to allow a competitive wholesale
market to take shape. The deregulation plan allowed incumbent utilities
to recover 100 percent of their stranded costs ($11 billion total) without
any proceedings to determine their validity. Consumers could not switch
electric companies without a surcharge for stranded costs being added to
their utility bills. Many believe that this policy severely handicapped
competition from the start.272 By the end of the market development pe-
riod, the limited number of competitive electric suppliers led the Public
Utilities Commission of Ohio (Ohio PUC) to develop three-year rate sta-
bilization plans (RSPs) in order to minimize the effects of "sticker
shock" and gradually transition customers to market-based rates. The
current RSPs are to last from January 1, 2006, until December 31,
2008.273
In October 2003, a legislative report encouraged the Ohio PUC to
"continue to take the necessary steps ... to ensure that a healthy com-
petitive market is in place before full electric competition begins.,
274
This report was an important source of the legislative support for the
Ohio PUC's development of RSPs, and RSPs were put in place for AEP,
Dayton Power & Light (DP&L), Duke Energy Ohio, and FirstEnergy.
2 75
270. Am. Sub. S.B. 3 (1999), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillTextl23/123-
SB 3 ENR.html (amending various sections of Ohio's Revised Code).
271. Ohio Consumers' Counsel v. PUC, 847 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (Ohio 2006).
272. See Dennis J. Willard, All Sides of Debate Agree: Ohio Energy Prices to Rise, AKRON
BEACON JOURNAL, Oct. 21, 2007.
273. The Market Development Period, OHIO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION,
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In May 2007, with the impending expiration of the Rate Stabiliza-
tion Plans, Ohio legislators and utility regulators began "working on a
preemptive plan to avoid the potential rate shock that could ensue in
2009 when Ohio investor-owned utilities are required to procure power
at market prices, following the termination of existing rate stabilization
plans. 276 Ohio Governor Ted Strickland responded by announcing a
platform for utility reforms called the "Energy Compact," which sought a
"principled, well-considered approach" to issues affecting the electricity
market.277 On August 29, 2007, Governor Strickland announced that his
Energy Compact would include requirements that 25 percent of the elec-
tricity of Ohio be generated by "advanced energy technologies," and that
at least half of this electricity would come from renewable sources.278
On October 31, 2007, the Ohio Senate passed Governor Strick-
land's Energy, Jobs, and Progress Bill (SB 221).279 This bill had been
amended several times, and would freeze rates upon the expiration of the
RSPs and implement a hybrid approach to ratemaking thereafter. 280 The
bill would require utilities to get permission from the Ohio PUC to move
to market-based rates. Upon such a request for permission, the Ohio
PUC would consider the state of the market and the current, regulated
price. The bill would also let utilities negotiate with affiliates for rates to
charge consumers for power without any regulatory review. The debate
is expected to continue throughout 2008, given that the current Rate Sta-
276. Fitch Report: Proposed Ohio Electric Restructuring Legislation Spurs Uncertainty,
BUSINESS WIRE, Dec. 17, 2007.
277. The principles of the Energy Compact include:
* Restoring lost faith in government and public utilities by designing clear,
common-sense plans and being responsible for accomplishing them.
* Giving electric customers equal footing with utility companies so the public
understands the issues involved in electric power decision-making.
* Making energy efficiency a central element in addressing electric regulation.
Stimulating consumption of renewable energy sources to attract investment in
advanced energy technology.
* Modernizing Ohio's electric infrastructure.
* Taking into account environmental issues, especially global warming, and in-
tegrating them as a guiding concern in electricity regulation.
Strickland: Ohio Needs to Fix Electric Deregulation, Bus. COURIER OF CINCINNATI, May 1, 2007,
available at http://www.bizjoumals.com/cincinnati/stories/2007/04/30/daily23.html.
278. Businesses Counting on Strickland Plan to Avert Energy Bill Spike, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 31, 2007, available at
http://www.redorbit.com/news/business/I 050922/businessescounting on strickland plan to avert
_energybill spike/index.html.
279. See Paul Wilson, Electricity-Regulation Bill Wins Senate Approval, THE COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 2007, at 10C.
280. Sub. S.B. No. 221 § 4928.17, 127th Ohio Gen. Assem. (amending various sections of
Ohio's Revised Code).
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bilization Plans in Ohio are scheduled to expire on December 31,
2008.281 According to an industry observer, the relevant parties to the
proceedings have expressed widely divergent
opinions regarding the value of competitive markets.282 The Ohio Indus-
trial Energy Users, for example, argued that an appropriately structured
competitive market had yet to materialize and that competitive markets
could not be relied upon for the procurement of electricity.283 One rating
agency, Fitch Ratings, noted the "uncertainty caused by the legislative
debate, as well as certain provisions of [SB 221], was a source of ongo-
ing concern for investors, '284 and stated that an outcome "that would re-
strict the companies' ability to recover power supply costs ... could lead
to future negative credit rating actions. 285
2. Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania,286 upon the December 31, 2005 expiration of rate
caps for Pike County Light and Power Company, 4,400 Pike customers
experienced an increase of over 70 percent in their total electric bill at
the beginning of 2006.287 The generation rate cap of PPL Electric Utili-
ties (PPL) is scheduled to expire at the end of 2009.288 The generation
rate caps of PECO Energy Company, West Penn Power Company, Met-
ropolitan Edison Company, and Pennsylvania Electric Company are due
to expire at the end of 2010.289 In May 2006, the Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission (Pennsylvania PUC) cited the events in Maryland
and Delaware to show that "consumers of electricity can be exposed to
sudden, dramatic price increases when long-term generation price caps,
mandated or agreed upon as part of various state restructuring proceed-
ings, expire., 290 Therefore, Pennsylvania PUC commenced a proceeding
to develop policies to address potential electric rate increases that follow
281. Restructuring Today, Ohio's SB 221 Passes Senate, Heads for House, Nov. 1, 2007,
http://www.restructuringtoday.com/public/12703.cfm.
282. Fitch Ratings, Ohio SB 221: Deregulation, Reregulation and Creditworthiness, Dec. 14,
2007, at 2.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1.
285. Id.
286. In December 1996, Pennsylvania enacted House Bill 1509, the Electricity
Generation Customer Choice and Competition Act, which required utilities to submit
restructuring plans by September 1997. Pennsylvania Restructuring Active,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/pennsylvania.html (last visited Mar. 1,
2008).
287. Investigation Order, Docket No. M-00061957, at 15 (Penn. PUC May 24, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.puc.state.pa.us/PcDocs/611864.
288. Id. at 3 n.4.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1.
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the expiration of generation rate caps. 29 1 Notably, the PUC did not raise
the possibility of merely extending the rate caps; in its Tentative Order,
the PUC "raised the idea of either phasing in rate increases prior to the
expiration of rate caps, or deferring some portion of the rate increases to
later years. 292
Some elected officials, on the other hand, proposed an extension of
the rate caps in reaction to the expected rate increases, and Pennsylvania
Governor Ed Rendel had indicated he would sign a bill if it included
"reasonable" rate caps.293 One state senator indicated she was consider-
ing a bill to extend the rate cap on what PPL could charge customers for
electricity generation.294 PPL, for its part, is "vehemently opposed" to an
extension, which it says would push the company into bankruptcy.295
The final order issued in the May 2007 proceeding outlined the
need for a statewide consumer education campaign to prepare electricity
ratepayers for potential increases, as well as to provide information about
energy efficiency, conservation, and demand-side response.296 In re-
sponse to the anticipated expiration of its rate cap in 2010, PPL proposed
a "competitive bridge plan" designed to ease the impact of higher
prices.297 Under its bridge plan, which the Pennsylvania PUC approved
in May 2007, the utility would conduct a series of up to six auctions in
2007, 2008, and 2009 for power supplies needed in 2010, thereby
producing a "blend" of contracts that would minimize the rate impact.
298
Even after taking into account the rate mitigating impacts of this pro-
posal, PPL expected its customers' bills to increase by about 35 percent
in 2010 for residential customers and up to 42 percent for some busi-
nesses.299  PPL, therefore, proposed a five-year plan that would allow
291. See id. at 1-3.
292. Tentative Order, Docket No. M-00061957, at 17 (Penn. PUC Feb. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.puc.state.pa.us/PcDocs/653886.doc.
293. Jeanne Bonner, PPL Files Bid for Phased Rate Hike: Company Says Impact Will be Less
iflt's Not All Imposed at Once, THE MORNING CALL, Dec. 4, 2007, at D 1.
294. Sam Kennedy, Is Free Market For Electricity a Done Deal? Cap on Generation Charges
Set to Expire in State at End of 2009, and Lawmakers Might Fight Big Rate Hike, THE MORNING
CALL, Aug. 19, 2007, at D1.
295. Id.
296. See Final Order, Docket No. M-00061957 (Penn. PUC May 17, 2007), available at
http://www.puc.state.pa.us/PcDocs/662103.doc.
297. Pennsylvania PUC Votes to Approve PPL Plan to Make Extended Bid for Post Rate-Cap
Power, GLOBAL POWER REPORT, May 17, 2007, at 19.
298. Id.
299. Jeanne Bonner, PPL Files Bid for Phased Rate Hike: Company Says Impact Will be Less
ifIt's Not All Imposed at Once, THE MORNING CALL, Dec. 4, 2007, at DI. According to PPL, since
the rate caps were established in the late 1990s, increases in fuel costs-natural gas up 250 percent
and coals costs up 55 percent-have resulted in higher wholesale prices. Pennsylvania PUC Votes
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customers to start making additional payments in their electric bills be-
ginning in mid-2008, continuing through the end of 2009.300 Money
from those payments, plus interest, would be applied to bills in 2010,
2011, and 2012. 3°1
3. New York
There are some preliminary discussions in New York about revisit-
ing the restructured electric utility industry. As in other restructured
states, New York utilities have divested most of their generation and op-
erate primarily as transmission and distribution companies which secure
their power supply in the open market. 30 2 A New York Assemblyman
has claimed that "deregulation is a flop," and he introduced legislation
that required utilities to sign long-term contracts and required the state to
generate more power.30 3 In support of his proposal, the Assemblyman
cited a study30 4 showing that prices in New York had increased by about
38 percent from 2000 to 2007,305 as compared to the 27 percent price
increases during the same period in the "regulated" states.30 6 According
to the Assemblyman, the problem with the restructured system is that
"prices bear no relation to cost" inasmuch as generators receive a clear-
ing price for their power based on the last, most expensive MWh pro-
duced, regardless of actual costs of production.30 7 Under a return to tra-
ditional regulation, utilities could own generating units and enter into
long-term power purchase agreements, and retail electric rates would be
set based on the actual costs incurred by the utility rather than the mar-
ket-based price from the wholesale market.
to Approve PPL Plan to Make Extended Bid for Post Rate-Cap Power, GLOBAL POWER REPORT,
May 17, 2007, at 19 [hereinafter PPL Plan].
300. Bonner, supra note 300.
301. Id.
302. In its May 1996 order in the Competitive Opportunities Case, the New York Public Ser-
vice Commission (NYPSC) required electric utilities to submit restructuring plans by October 1996.
Between July 1996 and February 1998, the NYPSC approved restructuring plans for Orange &
Rockland Utilities, Consolidated Edison, Rochester Gas & Electric, New York State Electric & Gas,
Central Hudson Gas & Electric, and Niagara Mohawk, respectively. NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY,
SHEDDING LIGHT ON THE GOVERNOR'S FAILED ELECTRIC UTILITY RESTRUCTURING: A BRIEFING
PAPER ON MOVING TO COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY (Feb. 1999), available at
http://www.assembly.state.ny.us/Reports/Energy/199902/.
303. New York Assemblyman Calls for Return to Long-Term PPAs to Lower State's Rates,
GLOBAL POWER REPORT, Sept. 20, 2007, at 30.
304. Id. The Assemblyman commissioned a study by Marilyn Showalter, executive director of
Power in the Public Interest, which compared electric rates in "deregulated" versus regulated states.
Id.
305. Id. (from 10.4 cents/kWh to 14.4 cents/kWh). Id.
306. Id. (from 6.0 cents/kWh to 7.6 cents/kWh) Id.
307. PPL Plan, supra note 299, at 30.
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4. Michigan
Michigan's restructuring law, enacted in June 2000, provided for an
immediate five percent rate reduction for residential customers of The
Detroit Edison Company (Detroit Edison) and for Consumers Energy
Company (Consumers Energy), followed by capped rates through De-
cember 31, 2005.308 Following the initial years of Michigan's electric
choice programs, in which participation levels were steady, competition
in Michigan's electric market declined considerably in both 2005 and
2006. During 2005, the number of customers participating and overall
megawatt load served in Michigan's electric choice market fell by ap-
proximately 20 percent and 40 percent, respectively. 30 9 During 2006, the
total number of choice customers and associated megawatts of load re-
ceiving service under the choice programs were approximately 51 per-
cent and 43 percent less, respectively, than in 2005. 3 10 The decline in
choice enrollments and electric load for the second year in a row was
attributed largely to significantly higher wholesale electricity prices
compared to relatively lower utility power supply rates.311
In the spring of 2007, the utility industry commenced an effort to
roll back the Michigan Restructuring Act. In testimony before the
Michigan House of Representatives' Energy and Technology Committee,
Detroit Edison's Chief Executive Officer urged Michigan lawmakers to
scrap the electric choice law, claiming it "severely restricts" efforts by
utilities to invest in new base load generation.3 12 He described the law as
leaving the state's electric industry "partly regulated and partly unregu-
lated," which "creates uncertainties for all electricity suppliers. 313 Sub-
sequent testimony by several independent power producers, however,
revealed willingness to consider building new power plants in Michigan
if the Restructuring Act were retained.3 14 The House Energy and Tech-
308. The Customer Choice and Electric Reliability Act, 2000 Mich. Pub. Acts 141 (Michigan
Restructuring Act).
309. Status of Electric Competition in Michigan, Report for Calendar Year 2005, at 1 (Michi-
gan PSC Feb. 1, 2006).
310. Status of Electric Competition in Michigan, Report for Calendar Year 2006, at 3 (Michi-
gan PSC Feb. 1, 2007).
311. Id. Upon expiration of the rate cap, on January 1, 2006, Detroit Edison implemented a 7%
increase for residential customers. Case No. U-13808, Order Issued November 23, 2004. Consum-
ers Energy also increased its rates by $86 million on January 1, 2006, upon expiration of the rate
caps. Case No. U-14347, Order Issued December 22, 2005.
312. DTE Energy CEO Calls for End to Michigan's Electric Choice, Citing Investment Con-
cerns, GLOBAL POWER REPORT, Apr. 19, 2007, at 24.
313. Id.
314. IPPs Back Electric Choice in Michigan; Express Interest in Building New Plants,
GLOBAL POWER REPORT, May 17, 2007, at 26.
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nology Committee took additional evidence in December 2007 regarding
the Michigan Restructuring Act but took no vote.315 According to a Feb-
ruary 1, 2008 report from the Michigan PSC, the legislature was
"working on a multi-bill package of reforms and updates to existing acts
governing the electric industry" that, if enacted, would "affect the status
of electric competition in Michigan for many years to come. 316
5. Maine
During the 2007 legislative session, the Maine legislature adopted a
resolution requiring the Maine Public Utilities Commission (Maine PUC)
to undertake a review of the issues involved with the "re-entry" of the
Maine electric utilities into the electric supply business.317 Following the
adoption of the Restructuring Act in 1997,318 Maine electric utilities
were required to divest most of their generation assets, becoming "wires"
companies. The 2007 Resolution was adopted as a compromise follow-
ing action by a legislative committee to block attempts by Maine utilities
to get back into the generation business. 319 The state's utilities had been
pushing for the ability to get back into the generation business, arguing
that restructuring had failed to deliver promised rate relief for small cus-
tomers. 320  According to one observer, however, "Maine is considered
one of the more successful restructured states because a large portion of
its business customers have switched to competitive suppliers, electric
rates are relatively low, and capacity remains plentiful.
321
315. Global Power Report, Utilities Seek Roll-back of Customer Choice in Michigan to Support
Plans to BuildNew Plants, Dec. 20, 2007, at 26.
316. Status of Electric Competition in Michigan, Report for Calendar Year 2007, at 21 (Michi-
gan PSC Feb. 1, 2008).
317. 2007 Me. Laws Ch. 54 (Resolves) (2007), available at
http://janus.state.me.us/legis/ros/lomi/LOM I 23rd/RESOLVE54.asp.
318. 1997 Me. Laws Ch. 316 (1997), available at
http://janus.state.me.us/legis/ros/lom/LOM 118th/LOM27 Ito350-45.htm#P 1213_212015.
319. Maine Committee Blocks Bills to Allow Utilities to Return to Generation in Deregulated
State, GLOBAL POWER REPORT, May 17, 2007, at 26.
320. Id. Under "re-entry," utilities would re-enter the generation business by either building or
owning power plants, or by signing long-term power supply deals with generators.
321. Id. In December 2004, the power procurement auction resulted in a nearly 30 percent
increase in the electric standard offer price for residential and small commercial customers due to the
significantly higher costs associated with producing electricity in the New England region. 2004
Annual Report on Electric Restructuring, at 4 (Me. PUC Dec. 31, 2004), available at
www.maine.gov/mpuc/staying-informed/legislative/2005legislation/ERR-Report-final.pdf. In Oc-
tober 2000, the Maine PUC had approved a 33 percent increase for customers served under Bangor-
Hydro Electric Company's standard offer, which resulted from rising oil and natural gas costs.
The 2002 Annual Report noted that during 2001, the wholesale market exhibited volatile and
sometimes high generation prices, which resulted in high retail prices for consumers and
difficulties in procuring and administering standard offer service." 2002 Annual Report on
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In accordance with the 2007 Resolution, the Maine PUC com-
menced a proceeding to gather information, viewpoints, and recommen-
dations from interested persons on the issues raised in the 2007 Resolu-
tion. In its January 15, 2008 Report to the Utilities & Energy Commit-
tee, the Maine PUC recommended against any immediate legislative
changes that would allow the state's utilities to re-enter the business of
owning generating assets.322 In 2006, the Maine legislature had previ-
ously authorized the Maine PUC to direct two of Maine's utilities, Cen-
tral Maine Power and Bangor-Hydro Electric Company, to enter into
long-term contracts for capacity and associated energy, and the report
concluded that there should be "a sufficient opportunity to test the poten-
tial to achieve" benefits for customers through long-term contracting be-
fore allowing utilities to own generation. 323 It should be noted that no
commenter in the proceeding suggested a complete retreat from electric
restructuring and a return to vertically integrated electric utility monopo-
lies. 324 The "re-entry" proposal under consideration would have allowed
investor-owned utilities to own or obtain an interest in generation assets
on a "regulated" basis so that their customers, who would pay for these
assets on a cost-of-service basis, would have some "hedge" against open
market prices.325
6. Montana
In May 2007, the Montana legislature enacted House Bill 25, which
reversed many of the provisions of the Electric Utility Industry Restruc-
turing and Consumer Choice Act (Montana Restructuring Act) passed in
April 1997 .326 The Montana Restructuring Act provided for a two-year
rate freeze beginning in July of 1998 and called for retail access for large
industrial customers by July 1998 and for all consumers by July 2002
(subsequently delayed until July 2004 by the Montana Public Service
Commission). Under House Bill 25, which became effective on Octo-
ber 1, 2007, the Restructuring Act's customer-choice provision, which
Electric Restructuring, at 5 (Me. PUC Dec. 31, 2002), available at
www.maine.gov/mpuc/stayinginformed/legislative/2002legislation/ERR-RPT.pdf.
322. Report on Transmission & Distribution Utilities Participation in the Energy Supply Busi-
ness, at 17 (Me. PUC Jan. 15, 2008).
323. Id. at 18.
324. Id. at 6.
325. Id.
326. 2007 Mont. Laws Ch. 491.
Seattle University Law Review
allowed customers to shop rates and switch back and forth between utili-
ties, was eliminated.327
IV. CONCLUSION
Under each of the state restructuring experiences examined in
this Article-Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, Illinois, and Ohio--the
"transition" to market-based rates involved (or will involve, in the case
of Ohio) a significant increase in retail electric rates. Over the term of
the rate freezes or rate caps adopted in each state, the power costs borne
by the utility and the revenues recovered by the utility ceased to track.
This outcome was the result of a combination of circumstances, includ-
ing the failure of anticipated competition to materialize and to provide
hoped-for benefits and the substantial increases in underlying costs of
fuels used to produce the wholesale power supply. Regardless of the
cause, however, upon expiration of the rate cap and upon undertaking the
required re-examination of the utility's financial circumstances, it was
clear that the imbalance needed to be corrected if the utility were to
maintain its financial integrity and ability to attract and retain capital.
The constitutional arguments available to the utilities were twofold:
(1) the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment (as applicable to state
action through the Fourteenth Amendment); and (2) the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Takings Clause and
Due Process Clause claims are factually interrelated and are often
brought in tandem in challenges to governmental rate or price-control
regulations, each is a distinct basis for challenge. The Takings Clause
claim has strong support in U.S. Supreme Court cases involving utility
ratemaking, and the principle that a utility is entitled under the Constitu-
tion to a fair rate of return as a matter of Takings Clause jurisprudence is
well-established, most recently in Duquesne. As a practical matter, how-
ever, the argument of unconstitutionality "as applied" under the Takings
Clause is fraught with peril for the utility. This is because of the eviden-
tiary challenges of making the financial showing and because of the
deference that would be accorded regulators in determining the "fair"
rate of return required to avoid the constitutionally prohibited confisca-
tory rate.
As discussed in this Article, under certain circumstances a Due
Process Clause challenge is also available where the effect of the state
action is to deny a mechanism under which the utility would have an op-
portunity to make its Takings Clause claim. The burden of prevailing on
327. Legislation in Montana that would Repeal State's Restructuring Law Passes in Senate,
GLOBAL POWER REPORT, Apr. 12, 2007, at 22.
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a Due Process Clause constitutional premise provides a far easier path
for a utility seeking to preserve (or restore) its financial health in the con-
text of rehabilitation of a state restructuring regime. Where a state per-
petuates a utility's under-recovery of costs such as through extension of a
rate plan-as was enacted in Illinois, was considered in Maryland and
Delaware, and apparently is under consideration in Ohio-the practical
effect is to deny the utility the mechanism to make its Takings Clause
case. Under the precedent established in the series of cases discussed in
this Article, the availability of this Due Process Clause challenge will
likely be of increasing relevance as states continue to struggle with the
results of their restructuring regimes.
